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From the MVR to Chaoulli v.
Quebec: The Road Not Taken and
the Future of Section 7
Jamie Cameron∗

I. INTRODUCTION
It was unfortunate, if not inevitable, that section 7 became the Charter’s
problem child.1 Inevitable, perhaps, because the guarantee’s structure
and text present interpretive puzzles.2 To begin, section 7 calls on courts
to build concrete definitions from abstract concepts like liberty, security
and fundamental justice.3 Its structure requires judges to develop a
relationship between its first clause, which identifies “entitlements”, and
a second clause, which is concerned with “deprivations”. The
conjunctive “and” does not settle whether the guarantee protects two
rights or one. Further confusion arises under the second clause, which
contains an internal limit and suggests that entitlements can be
infringed, as long as the deprivation complies with textually
indeterminate principles of fundamental justice (“PFJ”). Yet an internal
limit of that kind can only confound the relationship between section 7’s
concept of fundamental justice and section 1’s standard of reasonable
limits. If it is plain that a justification exercise is pointless after section 7
has balanced interests, section 1 nonetheless demands that infringements

∗

Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful to Jonathan Bricker (LL.B. 2008) for his
assistance in the editing process, and to Bridget Hauserman (LL.B. 2007) for research assistance in
the preparation of the conference draft. I would also like to recognize my Section 7 Seminar class
(Winter 2006), and to acknowledge how much I learned about s. 7 from class discussion and
research papers.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
A chronological list of the key cases discussed in this article is provided; see Appendix,
Master Case List.
3
Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.”
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undergo a reasonable limits analysis. In a broader context, the guarantee
heads up the Charter’s “Legal Rights”, and should be understood
alongside its other entitlements. Unlike section 7, which references
abstract concepts, those provisions specify the protections they offer.
Section 7’s problems are unfortunate, too, because at least some of
them could have been avoided. If it was difficult enough that the text
consigned the above questions to the courts, the guarantee’s genesis
superimposed other challenges on its interpretation. Though those who
drafted it were clear that the provision was restricted to procedural
matters, the Court resisted that conception, as a stingy view of section
7’s possibilities clashed with the “living tree” approach to
interpretation.4 That view also strained against the instinct that a
guarantee of fundamental justice must include questions of substance. In
the circumstances, a procedural conception of the guarantee became the
“road not taken”.5
In granting section 7 a substantive interpretation, the Motor Vehicle
Reference (“MVR”) treated the divide between procedure and substance
as the locus for debate about the legitimacy of review under section 7.6
That debate had little resonance in Canada before 1982, but was
imported from the United States when the Charter arrived. It sparked a
contest, which is predictable in such matters, between those who
insisted that American concerns are not ours and should be
unceremoniously dismissed for that reason, and others who thought it
naive to imagine that we in Canada could escape a debate that has had
long-standing traction in the United States. More than any other
provision, section 7 has borne the brunt of Americanized doubts about
the legitimacy of review under the Charter.7
Despite the constraints of what was intended and what American
experience cautioned, the text of section 7 enabled members of the

4
Justice Lamer, as he then was, explained: “If the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the
Charter is to have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure
that historical materials … do not stunt its growth.”; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British
Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 52 [hereinafter “MVR”].
5
Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken” (1915).
6
“The substantive/procedural dichotomy … is largely bound up in the American
experience with substantive and procedural due process [and] imports into the Canadian context
American concepts, terminology and jurisprudence, all of which are inextricably linked to problems
concerning the nature and legitimacy of adjudication under the U.S. Constitution”; id., at para. 17.
7
See K. Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2001).
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Court to generate divergent, highly individualized views of the
guarantee. At one end of the spectrum, McIntyre J.’s reluctance to
engage the substantive content of the guarantee stands to this day as a
model of institutional modesty.8 Set against his view is the position
Arbour J. advanced in a series of dissents, which essentially treated
section 7 as a corrective for injustice, wherever and whenever it is
found.9
Other interpretations of section 7 staked out a variety of positions in
between. Former Chief Justice Lamer thought that substantive review
could expand in some directions and contract in others. His plan for
section 7 opened the administration of justice up for substantive review
and shut the enterprise down in other settings.10 Though it has not
prevailed over time, that view played a critical role in the evolution of
the jurisprudence. Meanwhile, an arbitrary limit on liberty or security of
the person is what triggers McLachlin C.J.; as her plurality opinion in
Chaoulli v. Quebec reveals, she is not hesitant to intervene in such
circumstances.11 Other members of the Court, including Wilson and La
Forest JJ., have also made vital contributions. Though each endorsed a
definition of liberty that would protect an individual’s fundamental
personal choices from interference by the state,12 section 7 balancing is a
distinctive feature of La Forest J.’s legacy.13 In another direction,

8

See, e.g., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; R. v. Vaillancourt,
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (dissenting opinions).
9
See, e.g., Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
429; R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571; and Canadian Foundation for
Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
76 [hereinafter “CYF”]; (dissenting opinions).
10
See, e.g., Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990]
S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 [the “Solicitation Reference”]; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society
of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [hereinafter “CAS”]
(concurring opinions).
11
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791
[hereinafter “Chaoulli”]; see also Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J.
No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (dissenting opinion).
12
On the definition of liberty, see Wilson J. in R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 284, and Morgentaler, supra, note 8 (concurring opinion); La Forest J. in CAS, supra, note
10; and Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, Appendix A, id.
13
See, e.g., R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309; R. v. Beare, [1987]
S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; and Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of
Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 425.
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L’Heureux-Dubé J. insisted that equality be read into the guarantee as
an overarching qualification to its entitlements.14
Still, the best evidence of section 7’s irresolution may be Bastarache
J.’s decision to join the plurality opinion in Chaoulli v. Quebec.15 The
question there was whether a section 7 claim having no connection with
the administration of justice was viable. Having insisted in Gosselin v.
Quebec that such a link was the sine qua non of the guarantee, he agreed
that a prohibition on private health insurance was unconstitutional in
Chaoulli.16
Judicial choices under section 7 engage core beliefs about the
Charter and the Court’s mandate of review. That is why any theory
about section 7 is necessarily a theory about the Charter. The dilemma
of review is that the courts must enforce the Charter’s entitlements
without committing institutional transgressions. That dilemma is
magnified under section 7 by the indeterminacy of the text and the
questions of legitimacy which naturally follow when abstract concepts
are concretized. The Court made a critical choice in the MVR not to turn
its back on the text’s appeal to principles of fundamental justice. And it
has paid a price for doing so: there, and at other key junctures, the
decision to expand section 7 has provoked fierce debate about the
legitimacy of review.17
From the start, the Court found strategies to mask or even avoid the
dilemma of section 7. For instance, after granting the guarantee a
substantive interpretation, the MVR promptly placed boundaries around
it to ensure that review would remain selective in scope and content. In
particular, the MVR proposed a conception of section 7 that was based
on the Court’s perception of what was institutionally permissible for it
to do. More than 20 years later, the MVR’s attempt to constrain the
guarantee and control the legitimacy debate must be declared a failure.
Though Chaoulli’s “constitutionalization” of health care policy looks

14

See, e.g., R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (dissenting on the
production of records); see also R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
15
Supra, note 11. There, a plurality of three, on a panel of seven judges, invalidated
Quebec’s prohibition on private health insurance.
16
Compare his dissenting opinion in Gosselin, supra, note 9, with his vote to join the
McLachlin-Major JJ. plurality in Chaoulli, supra, note 11.
17
The Court’s most controversial decisions under s. 7 are: the Motor Vehicle Reference,
supra, note 4; R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 8; R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 63; and Chaoulli v. Quebec, supra, note 11.
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like a dramatic shift in the interpretation of section 7, to some extent that
decision simply followed the momentum of the jurisprudence.
The Court’s decisions in the MVR and Chaoulli v. Quebec serve as
bookends for this paper. Its goal of providing a holistic account of the
guarantee begins with the saga of “MV logic” and its dominance in the
jurisprudence. From there attention shifts to the interpretation of section
7’s two clauses, and is followed by a discussion of the choices the Court
must consider in deciding what to do with section 7. The discussion
proceeds in three stages. A first section explains what MV logic is, and
shows how its institutional conception of review was destined to fail.
That part analyzes the evolution of the section 7 jurisprudence and
provides the foundation for the rest of the paper; for those reasons it is
longer than its counterparts.
The next section turns to the Court’s interpretation of section 7’s
two clauses and explains the shifting methodologies it employs to give
them meaning. It may be harsh to say so, but this jurisprudence is
obtuse, even impenetrable. It is difficult to explain the Court’s PFJ
methodology when different standards apply at different times to
determine which principles relate to fundamental justice, and whether
those principles have been violated. The uncertainty of this body of
doctrine shows that the Court has been unable to address the central
dilemma of section 7 or to settle on an interpretive model for this
guarantee.
Thus far, MV logic has been the dominant force in the evolution of
the section 7 jurisprudence. That logic failed to offer a coherent theory
of review and compromised the Court’s interpretation of the guarantee’s
two clauses. By suggesting that the Court may be ready to break away
from its constraints, Chaoulli v. Quebec places section 7 at the
crossroads. That is why this is a crucial juncture in the guarantee’s
evolution: if the Court is not prepared to accept the limits on review
suggested by the MVR, still it remains unclear what alternative
conception should be adopted. Given the consequences for the Court’s
legitimacy, the wisdom of dismissing a model for section 7 that is based,
in part or even in whole, on an institutional conception of the guarantee
is open to serious question. In this context, the final part of the paper
introduces the interpretive choices available in deciding the future of
section 7. Unable to advance a proposal in the late stages of this paper, it
voices skepticism that a substantive interpretation of the guarantee can
be constrained by institutional boundaries, and remains troubled by the

110

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

prospect of an approach that cannot or will not articulate the limits of
review.

II. MOTOR VEHICLE LOGIC AND THE SEARCH FOR
LIMITS ON REVIEW
1. An Institutional Conception of Review
On its face, the Motor Vehicle Reference appears to lack transcending
significance. In the main it followed Sault Ste. Marie, which was widely
praised for endorsing the principle that criminal responsibility requires
fault.18 The wrinkle in the MVR was that the Court extended the fault
principle by exercising new-found powers under the Charter and
invalidating section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act. That provision
created an absolute liability offence which offended the Court’s sense of
justice because it could convict and imprison a person “who has not
really done anything wrong”.19 The difference between Sault Ste. Marie
and the MVR was that section 7 empowered the Court to grant a remedy
for a provision it would find objectionable at common law, but be
powerless to rectify.
Sound as it might have seemed on the point about criminal
responsibility, the MVR’s substantive interpretation of section 7 claimed
dramatic powers of review. The Court’s conclusion defied the intent of
the guarantee’s drafters and in doing so dismissed the distinction
between substance and procedure.20 Justice Lamer’s assertion that the
controversy surrounding section 7’s due process analogue was irrelevant
struck a tone of arrogance. Aware that a substantive interpretation
placed the Court’s legitimacy at risk, the judges were nonetheless
unwilling to let an injustice go unanswered, when the Charter could
invalidate a provision that offended the fault principle. The legitimacy
issue was answered by the argument that substantive review could be
undertaken, without institutional consequences, as long as it was
confined to matters within the justice system.
18

R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299.
MVR, supra, note 4, at para. 1.
20
See M. Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter” (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 183, and S. Choudhry, “The Lochner Era
and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1-55,
at 16-27 (providing extensive discussion of the dynamics which surrounded the drafting of s. 7).
19
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Justice Lamer grounded “MV logic” in section 7’s status as one of
the Charter’s “Legal Rights” and in its relationship, as such, to sections
8–14. Those provisions protect certain entitlements in the criminal
justice system and it made sense that section 7 should do the same;
under Lamer J.’s view of text and context, the guarantee could do no
less.21 He maintained that it was undesirable to recognize a distinction
between substance and procedure, because that would “import”
American concepts and terminology into a Canadian context and leave
section 7’s entitlements in “a sorely emaciated state”.22 More to the
point, the distinction was unnecessary as a way of limiting section 7,
because the text explicitly referred to principles of fundamental justice.23
He reasoned that such a reference excluded review on issues that fell
within the realm of general public policy.24 In the circumstances, a
substantive interpretation of section 7 could not exceed the boundaries
of review: policy questions falling outside the institutions of justice
would not be entertained because MV logic did not allow it. At least for
Lamer J. and those who agreed with him, the answer to questions about
the legitimacy of review was as simple and conclusive as that.
This form of logic rested on two assumptions about the guarantee.
First, a substantive interpretation was legitimate because section 7
engages the institutions of the justice system. In that sense, Lamer J.
proposed a conception of review that was explicitly institutional: its
legitimacy was based on and restricted to the legal system. Second, MV
logic assumed that justice and policy are separable, as a matter of
definition, and can be kept apart from each other.25 The Court would

21
“It would be incongruous”, he said, “to interpret s. 7 more narrowly than the rights in ss.
8 to 14”; the alternative, “which is to interpret all of ss. 8 to 14 in a ‘narrow and technical’ manner
for the sake of congruity, is out of the question” he added; MVR, supra, note 4, at para. 27.
22
Id., at para. 25.
23
Justice Lamer was explicit that his was an institutional concept of substantive review.
Thus he stated that “the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets and
principles, not only of our judicial process, but also of other components of our legal system”
(emphasis added). To that he added, “[w]hether any given principle may be said to be a principle of
fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7 will rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources,
rationale and essential role of that principle within the judicial process and in our legal system, as
it evolves”; id., at paras. 62, 64 (emphasis added).
24
Justice Lamer’s well-known words claimed the following distinction as the basis for
substantive review under s. 7: “[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic
tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the inherent
domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system”; id., at para. 30 (emphasis added).
25
Hence the assertion that MV logic “provides meaningful content for the s. 7 guarantee
all the while avoiding adjudication of policy matters”; id., at para. 30.
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discover in due course that an interface with policy could not be avoided
by confining review to the justice system. By the same token, the Court
would also learn that laws having little or nothing to do with the
institutions or administration of the justice system could also be
fundamentally unjust. From that perspective, MV logic did not
convincingly explain why review would be exercised on questions
arising in the administration of justice, but not elsewhere.
If judicial choices under section 7 reveal core beliefs, and a theory
of the guarantee is also a theory of the Charter, the MVR may
unwittingly be the Court’s most important Charter decision. Justice
Lamer endorsed substantive review against the intent of the drafters, and
disingenuously dismissed the weight of American experience. In doing
so, he rejected the distinction between substance and procedure, and
grounded his theory of review in an even less plausible distinction
between justice and policy. In the result, MV logic claimed that a
substantive interpretation of section 7 was permissible because it
selectively targeted the institutions of justice.
Commentators did not hesitate to express their skepticism. John
Whyte claimed that “[w]e are now positioned for a very, very
interventionist court” and added that “[f]or those who worried about
judicial intervention, their worries have been vindicated”.26 Jamie
Cameron complained that the Court’s interpretation of section 7 created
a no-win situation: if the Court was selective about section 7’s content,
it would be criticized for making value choices on subjective grounds;
but if it was expansive in its interpretation of the guarantee, it would be
open to criticism for being too interventionist and for exceeding its
authority.27 More scathing was David Frum, who criticized the judges
for their breezy declaration that “they did not consider themselves
bound by the intentions of the drafters”, because “[t]hey were a court of
justice, dammit, and they were going to say what was fundamentally
just and what wasn’t”.28

26
Quoted in K. Makin, “Charter Ruling Worries Legal Experts” The Globe and Mail (24
February 1986).
27
Quoted in P. Cramer, “Charter misapplied, misunderstood by judges, profs say” The
Lawyers Weekly (27 June 1986), at 12. See also J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and the
Relevance of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987), at 69.
28
“Who’s Running this Country, Anyway?” Saturday Night (October 1988), at 63.
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The next sections trace the evolution of section 7 and, in doing so,
show how the Court was unwilling to release the guarantee from the
constraints of MV logic, and unwilling, at the same time, to be bound by
that logic.
2. The Elements of an Offence: Mens Rea
In modest terms, the MVR simply held that the combination of absolute
liability and imprisonment is impermissible because it violates
principles of fundamental justice. Yet it followed that if the Court could
invalidate a law that eliminated the mens rea, it could also review a
Code provision that made inadequate provision for the fault element. On
the strength of that reasoning, the Court extended absolute liability’s
concern with the morally innocent to the Criminal Code’s second degree
felony murder provision. In due course, that brought it to the realization
that the concept of fault did not respect the MVR’s fail-safe distinction
between justice and policy.
The weapons subsection of the Code’s second degree felony murder
provision created constructive liability when death occurred in the
course of named felonies, regardless whether the offender or an
accomplice intended or reasonably foresaw that consequence. In striking
it down in R. v. Vaillancourt, Lamer J. simply applied MV logic.29
According to the MVR, it is fundamentally unjust to punish a person
who is not at fault. Translated to the offence of felony murder, the
question was whether there was fault in causing death and not in simply
deciding to commit a felony. Though Vaillancourt invalidated the
provision because it did not even require objective mens rea on the
actus reus element of death, Lamer J. did not hesitate to voice his
preference for a subjective standard. “[A]s a general rule”, he declared,
“the principles of fundamental justice require proof of a subjective mens
rea, in order to avoid punishing the ‘morally innocent’”.30 How he
described the Court’s mandate under the Charter was also telling. While
Parliament “retains the power to define the elements of a crime”, he
said, the courts have the jurisdiction and “more important, the duty … to

29
R. v. Vaillancourt, supra, note 8. At the time, s. 213(d) made it culpable homicide,
punishable as second degree murder, for a person to cause a death in the course of committing
certain specified felonies, when a person used a weapon or had it on his person, and death ensued as
a consequence. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(d).
30
Id., at para. 27.
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review that definition to ensure that it is in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice”.31
In formal terms the MVR was about absolute liability. Yet it
prompted the Court to express a “generally held revulsion against
punishment of the morally innocent”.32 In explaining why it was
problematic to constitutionalize that principle, the dissent in
Vaillancourt struck at the heart of MV logic. According to MacIntyre J.,
defining criminal offences and assigning penalties are a matter of policy
which rests with Parliament. He acknowledged that some might
consider it “illogical to characterize an unintentional killing as murder”,
but found no offence to the principles of fundamental justice when
serious criminal conduct is classified as murder.33 Penalizing a felony
which results in death as murder may be harsh, and it may also be harsh
to label such felons as murderers. Those were policy choices and the
fact that Parliament was hard-nosed on that issue did not render the
provision unconstitutional.
To the extent Vaillancourt hedged the point, R. v. Martineau
confirmed that section 7 entrenched a principle of symmetry between
the actus reus and mens rea.34 Martineau also indicated that subjective
mens rea was a constitutional minimum for murder and for other
offences. Though the Court invalidated a second felony murder
provision, Martineau was therefore a bold decision for other reasons as
well.35 Once again, the majority opinion by Lamer J. confirmed the
Court’s mandate of review under section 7 in sweeping terms. His
declaration that Parliament had “directed” the Court to “review its
definitions of the elements of a crime for compliance with the Charter”,
and that the judges would be “remiss not to heed this command of
Parliament”, was extraordinary.36 This he referred to nonetheless as an
“unassailable proposition”.37

31

Id., at para. 26 (emphasis added).
MVR, supra, note 4, at para. 71 (quoting Dickson J. in Sault Ste. Marie).
33
Vaillancourt, supra, note 8, at para. 51 (dissenting opinion).
34
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633. At stake in this case was s. 213(a) of the
Code, which made second degree murder available as a charge when a person committed any one
of certain specified felonies, intended to cause bodily harm, and the act resulted in death. Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(a).
35
Not only did the Court invalidate s. 213(a) in this case, it held that s. 212(c) of the Code
was also unconstitutional; id., at para. 14.
36
Id., at para. 7.
37
Id.
32
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Moral innocence led to a concept of moral blame, or relative moral
blame, through the symmetry principle. In stating that the constitutional
minimum for second degree murder is subjective mens rea, Lamer J.
suggested that symmetry might demand subjective fault throughout the
criminal law. He stopped short of declaring it the default requirement of
criminal responsibility, but emphasized that subject foresight of death
follows from the “general principle that criminal liability for a particular
result is not justified except where the actor possesses a culpable mental
state in respect of that result”.38 Specifically, he found that a second
degree murder provision that does not symmetrically require mens rea for
each element of the offence is fundamentally unjust, because such a
provision imposes a punishment that is disproportionate to the accused’s
moral blame.39 Justice Lamer emphasized the stigma that attaches to a
murder conviction as an additional aspect of its unconstitutionality. The
suggestion that undue stigma will compromise criminal offences figured
in the analysis of Vaillancourt and Martineau, before being turned against
the idea of subjective mens rea as a constitutional minimum, in R. v.
DeSousa and R. v. Creighton.
Following the lead of McIntyre J. in Vaillancourt, L’Heureux-Dubé
J. wrote a dissent in Martineau which made further inroads on MV logic.
She demonstrated that a conviction required a high degree of moral
blame: those who satisfied the provision’s requirements were not
morally innocent and are blameworthy in fact at several levels.40 She
also explained that the objectives of the provision are a matter of
criminal law policy, and not a question of abstract justice that is within
the exclusive prerogative of the judiciary.41 Implicitly, in commenting
38

Id., at para. 11 (emphasis added).
In particular, he stated that “[t]he effect of s. 213 is to violate the principle that
punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender”, id; he also
declared that “a special mental element with respect to death is necessary before a culpable
homicide can be treated as murder” and that “special mental element gives rise to the moral
blameworthiness that justifies the stigma and punishment attaching to a murder conviction”, id., at
para. 12.
40
Id., at para. 56 ( detailing five respects in which a person must be found blameworthy
before a conviction can be entered under this section).
41
“Policy considerations in Canada as well as in other jurisdictions have inspired
legislation that considers objective foreseeability sufficient as the minimum mens rea requirement
for murder …. Striking down legislation simply because some other scheme may be preferable
would be an unwarranted intrusion into Parliament’s prerogative…. The Charter does not infuse
the courts with the power to declare legislation to be of no force or effect on the basis that they
believe the statute to be undesirable as a matter of criminal law policy”; id., at paras. 94, 96
(emphasis added).
39

116

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

on the majority opinion’s refusal to hold an accused responsible for
consequences he did not intend, she foresaw the next step in the
evolution of the jurisprudence.
Following Martineau, the Court was poised to overhaul the
Criminal Code’s concept of blame. But when next asked to extend the
principle of moral innocence, it blinked. Rather than impose symmetry
between the wrongful act and the accused’s subjective fault across the
spectrum, R. v. DeSousa42 and R. v. Creighton43 decided that the
constitutionalization of mens rea would effectively begin and end with
felony murder.
The offence at stake in DeSousa bore strong resemblance,
structurally, to unlawful act manslaughter.44 In the setting of section 269
of the Code, the question was whether section 7 of the Charter required
a symmetrical and subjective fault element in relation to the prohibited
consequence of causing bodily harm. Justice Sopinka stressed the
element of personal fault, but rejected the suggestion that the Charter
requires subjective mens rea for all criminal offences which attach more
serious penalties when unlawful conduct produces prohibited
consequences. Section 269 did not violate section 7 because the
guarantee does not require subjective foresight of bodily harm: provided
there is “a sufficiently blameworthy element in the actus reus to which
a culpable mental state is attached”, he said, there is no further
requirement that the intention must extend to all aspects of an unlawful
act, including its consequences.45
Though it was concerned with the offence of unlawfully causing
bodily harm, DeSousa became a tipping point for the constitutionalization
of mens rea. Justice Sopinka observed that to adopt symmetry for all
consequences would “substantially restructure current notions of
criminal responsibility”.46 Not only was the Court unprepared to
invalidate a variety of offences, many of which were listed in DeSousa,
the judges did not accept that a person who causes unforeseen
consequences through unlawful action is morally innocent. Despite the
42

[1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944.
[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3.
44
Both are predicate offence provisions: a conviction under s. 269 requires an initial
unlawful act followed by a consequence of bodily harm, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.
269; a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter requires an initial unlawful act followed by a
consequence of death. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 222(5)(a).
45
DeSousa, supra, note 42, at para. 33 (emphasis added).
46
Id., at para. 38.
43
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“constitutional aversion” against it a defendant cannot be characterized
as morally innocent “simply because a particular consequence of an
unlawful act was unforeseen by that actor”.47 In effect, Sopinka J.
brought the concept of a minimum mens rea to a standstill with the
remark that “[n]either basic principles of criminal law, nor the dictates
of fundamental justice require, as necessity, intention in relation to the
consequences of an otherwise blameworthy act”.48 DeSousa essentially
held that a lesser and non-symmetrical degree of fault would satisfy
section 7’s standard of fundamental justice.49
For the concept of a minimum mens rea to lose all momentum it
remained only for R. v. Creighton to apply DeSousa to unlawful act
manslaughter.50 The Court was closely divided in Creighton, as it had
been in R. v. Tutton, which raised similar issues though not under the
Charter.51 Yet by the time Creighton was decided, no member of the
Court supported subjective fault for manslaughter. In dissent, Lamer
C.J. agreed that manslaughter required no more than objective foresight,
but concluded that foresight of death was needed to ground a
conviction. Justice McLachlin was able to attain majority support for the
view that objective foresight of bodily harm would suffice for purposes
of the Charter.
It is telling that McLachlin J. rejected symmetry as a principle of
fundamental justice. In her view, a rule which has exceptions cannot be
a principle of fundamental justice under section 7; to qualify as such,
she said, a rule must have universal application.52 That standard for
determining principles of fundamental justice, it bears noting, is difficult

47

Id.
Id.
49
See D. Stuart, “The Supreme Court Drastically Reduces the Constitutional Requirement
of Fault: A Triumphant Pragmatism and Law Enforcement Expediency” (1993) 15 C.R. (4th) 88, at
97 (commenting on DeSousa and observing that the Supreme Court “appears to have pragmatically
decided to call a halt to the full review of fault requirements earlier envisaged by Chief Justice
Lamer”).
50
Creighton, supra, note 43; see also R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J. No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
867 (also rejecting subjective mens rea).
51
[1989] S.C.J. No. 60, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392. The issue in Tutton was whether criminal
negligence was based on a subjective or objective standard of fault; the Court divided 3-3 and was
unable, as a result, to decide that question.
52
Creighton, supra, note 43, at para. 97. As Simon France noted, McLachlin J.’s argument
that a principle of fundamental justice cannot embrace exceptions “is rather puzzling” as it is
equally true of most criminal law principles, and suggests that “constitutional review of aspects of
the criminal law will always be disappointing”. “Gains and Lost Opportunities in Canadian
Constitutional Mens Rea” (1994-1995) 20 Queen’s L.J. 533, at 549.
48
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to meet. In addition, she explained that stigma and punishment would
only support a constitutional minimum in exceptional cases where the
consequences of being convicted are disproportionate to the accused’s
blameworthiness. The felony murder rule was an example of
disproportionality, but unlawful act manslaughter was not.53 And nor, it
hardly needed to be added, were any number of crimes which punish
offenders for the consequences they have caused.
The constitutionalization of mens rea effectively ended with
Creighton and its companion cases.54 When it did, it was not because the
Court was able to draw a sure-footed distinction between offences that
violated fundamental justice and others which did not. The problem was
that the MVR, with its principle of moral innocence and concept of a
minimum mens rea, could not preserve the boundary between justice
and policy. The defeat of that distinction also meant that MV logic failed
to articulate a workable theory of review in the forum it was designed to
address: the justice system. Disappointed commentators saw wholesale
retreat, if not an about-face, in the post-Martineau decisions.55 Despite
expansive statements in Vaillancourt and Martineau about the Court’s
mandate under section 7, the constitutionalization of mens rea achieved
few changes and was no more than a modest success. Still, retreat in this
context did not mean that the Court would be passive in other areas of
the criminal law.
3. Unfair Crimes
The Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in R. v. Morgentaler was
sandwiched between the MVR and Vaillancourt, on one side, and
Martineau, on the other.56 The MVR’s principle of moral innocence was
not at stake in Morgentaler, and nor was mens rea. Not only did it lack
53

Id., at para. 83: “The most important feature of the stigma of manslaughter is the stigma
which is not attached to it”; and, at para. 86: “[T]he offence of manslaughter stands in sharp
contrast to the offence of murder” because “[m]urder entails a mandatory life sentence;
manslaughter carries with it no minimum sentence”.
54
See also R. v. Gosset, [1993] S.C.J. No. 88, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76; R. v. Naglik, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 92, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122; R. v. Finlay, [1993] S.C.J. No. 89, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103.
55
As Patrick Healy observed: “The trend of the cases shows a court poised to lower the
standard of fault in criminal cases on grounds of policy, and to hold that such policy decisions not only
respect but promote principle of fundamental justice” (emphasis added). “The Creighton Quartet:
Enigma Variations in a Lower Key” (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 265, at 279; see also D. Stuart, “Continuing
Inconsistency But Also Now Insensitivity That Won’t Work” (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 240.
56
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
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connection with that jurisprudence, the challenge to the Code’s
prohibition placed the Court squarely in the middle of contested social,
moral, philosophical and religious views about the merits of abortion.
Though it did not arise under the section 15 equality guarantee, the case
implicated women’s rights, and did so against the backdrop of the
Court’s earlier, pre-Charter decision. There, the Court had been
criticized for denying relief from Parliament’s regulation of therapeutic
abortions.57 The decision to invalidate the Criminal Code’s abortion
scheme in Morgentaler was extraordinary: the Court intervened on the
side of women’s rights and showed that it was not afraid to exercise its
powers of review under the Charter.
As the Canadian Supreme Court’s abortion decision, Morgentaler is
sometimes thought of as a case that is issue-specific and result-oriented;
in this, it provided a point of comparison with Roe v. Wade.58 Beyond
that, it should be seen as a milestone in the development of the Court’s
section 7 methodology. Justice Wilson’s definition of liberty constitutes
one of Morgentaler’s contributions to the doctrine; the other is the
concept of a law that is “manifestly unfair”, and its use as a standard of
constitutionality under section 7.
Morgentaler was a high stakes case for the Court. The women’s
movement was politically and legally active at the time, and establishing
the constitutional right to an abortion was a top priority. Institutionally,
it was risky for the Court to invalidate Parliament’s abortion law. In the
absence of a majority opinion, attention gravitated to the reasons of then
Chief Justice Dickson, who found a violation of fundamental justice
without considering whether the Charter guarantees the right to an
abortion.59 That result was enabled by the conclusion that Parliament’s
scheme, which prohibited abortion and then created a therapeutic
exception, violated procedural principles of fundamental justice.
As seen above, the MVR’s conclusion that section 7 has substantive
content rested on the view that the substance-procedure distinction was
irrelevant. Chief Justice Dickson revived it in Morgentaler for strategic
reasons: a decision invalidating the Code provision was less
confrontational, vis-à-vis Parliament, if based on procedural grounds

57

See R. v. Morgentaler, [1975] S.C.J. No. 48, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59
The case was decided by three opinions: Dickson C.J., Lamer J. concurring; Beetz J.,
Estey J. concurring; and Wilson J. concurring, McIntyre J. dissented and La Forest J. concurred in
his reasons, supra, note 56.
58
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than if grounded in a substantive right to an abortion.60 The problem was
that the Chief Justice’s complaints about Parliament’s exceptions for
therapeutic abortions were more substantive than procedural in nature.
For instance, vagueness is a substantive flaw which arises when a law
fails to articulate its content with sufficient precision to satisfy rule of
law considerations.61 Chief Justice Dickson also found that therapeutic
abortions under the Code were compromised by delays which prevented
women from gaining timely access to the procedure. Yet it is difficult to
see how delay can be a constitutional violation if there is no right of
access to the procedure in the first place.62
Having dodged the substantive issue, the Chief Justice struggled to
place the analysis on a footing that was truly procedural. That is the
context of his conclusion that the law was unconstitutional because it
was “manifestly unfair”.63 He thought the scheme was unfair because the
conditions under which the procedure was available to Canadian women
were so strict that the concept of therapeutic abortions, as an exception
to the general prohibition, was illusory and manifestly unfair.64 Justice
Beetz, who also found it unconstitutional, invoked the same terminology
in stating that some of the scheme’s requirements “are manifestly unfair
because they have no connection whatsoever with Parliament’s
objectives in establishing the administrative structure”.65 Others he
found manifestly unfair because they were not necessary to ensure that
those objectives were met.
60

Thus, he explained that while s. 7 “does impose upon courts the duty to review the
substance of legislation … it is [not] necessary for the Court to tread the fine line between
substantive review and the adjudication of public policy”, because “it will be sufficient to
investigate whether or not the impugned legislative provisions meet the procedural standards of
fundamental justice”; id., at para. 15.
61
Id., at para. 47 (concluding that the absence of any clear standard to define “health” for
purposes of a therapeutic abortion is a serious procedural flaw) (emphasis added).
62
As McIntyre J. explained, it is difficult to see how any of the Code’s therapeutic
abortion criteria could violate security of the person unless a woman has a constitutionally
protected right to an abortion; id., at para. 191. Justice Wilson, who did support such a right, agreed
that the Court had to tackle the primary issue first: “A consideration as to whether or not the
procedural requirements for obtaining or performing an abortion comport with fundamental justice
is purely academic if such requirements cannot as a constitutional matter be imposed at all”; id., at
para. 221 (emphasis added).
63
Id., at para. 52 (concluding that “[i]n the present case, the structure – the system
regulating access to therapeutic abortions – is manifestly unfair”).
64
“One of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that when Parliament creates
a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should not be illusory or so difficult to attain as to be
practically illusory”; id., at para. 48.
65
Id., at para. 132.
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Though its impact on abortion policy was immediate, Morgentaler
had broad implications for the section 7 jurisprudence. It should be seen
as a first and critical step away from MV logic and the constraints it
sought to impose on review under section 7. It is significant, for
instance, that Wilson J. flatly refused to accept the MVR’s methodology.
Her opinion placed upward pressure on section 7’s entitlements by
expanding liberty of the person to embrace a right to make fundamental
personal choices, including the right to have an abortion, free from state
interference.66 Against the MVR’s admonitions, she cited American
jurisprudence to support that definition, and then modelled a substantive
right to abortion under the Charter on U.S. authority.67 Over time, her
conception of liberty would have a strong influence on the section 7
jurisprudence.
In addition, Morgentaler’s concept of manifest unfairness
introduced the idea that it is permissible for the Court to invalidate laws
that are considered fundamentally unfair. Chief Justice Dickson’s
reliance on the concept is deeply troubling, because manifest unfairness
does not offer a methodology or analytical process for determining the
content of section 7’s principles of fundamental justice. Its purpose,
instead, is to state a conclusion. It is without content or principle and
was, for that reason, a dangerous concept to introduce into the
jurisprudence.
Morgentaler was followed, a few years later, by Rodriguez v.
British Columbia (Attorney General), which considered whether the
Code’s criminalization of assisted suicide violated the sections 7 or 15
Charter rights of individuals who could not, by reason of disability or
physical deterioration, commit that act without third-party assistance.68
The decision’s role in the evolution of the Court’s PFJ methodology is
considered in the next section of the paper. The discussion here focuses
on the connection between Morgentaler’s concept of manifest
unfairness and the principle of arbitrariness that McLachlin J. invoked
in Rodriguez to invalidate section 241(b) of the Code.

66
Id., at para. 230 (maintaining that s. 7’s liberty, “properly construed”, grants the
individual “a degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental personal importance”).
67
Id., at para. 240 (citing Roe v. Wade and concluding that “the respect for individual
decision-making in matters of fundamental personal importance reflected in the American
jurisprudence also informs the Canadian Charter”); see also at paras. 259-60 (discussing Roe’s
trimester framework).
68
[1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
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From a conceptual and a doctrinal perspective, her opinion bears a
strong resemblance to Dickson C.J.’s analysis in Morgentaler. In fact,
she stated that the reasoning in Morgentaler was “dispositive” of the
section 7 issues at stake in Rodriguez.69 She maintained that the
provision was arbitrary because Parliament’s reasons for criminalizing
assisted suicide bore no relation to the circumstances of Sue Rodriguez.
It followed that the Code’s prohibition on assisted suicide treated her
“unfairly”.70 That was sufficient, in McLachlin J.’s view, to ground the
conclusion that section 241(b)’s prohibition violated section 7 of the
Charter and could not be saved by section 1. In defending that view, she
denied that she was second-guessing Parliament’s decision on a delicate
issue of policy: “[t]he only question”, she said, “is whether Parliament,
having chosen to act in this sensitive area touching the autonomy of
people over their bodies, has done so in a way that is fundamentally fair
to all”.71
Albeit a dissent, McLachlin J.’s opinion in Rodriguez should
nonetheless be noted in the evolution of section 7. Following
Morgentaler’s lead, she introduced another doctrinal tool to define the
principles of fundamental justice: the concept of arbitrariness. In
function and purpose, it differed little from Morgentaler’s principle of
manifest unfairness. Each offered the Court a basis for disagreeing with
the content of legislation and invalidating it as a result. Both concepts
collapsed the distinction between justice and policy, and in doing so,
ignored MV logic and its search for principled limits on review. Each
lacked criteria and both presented an unlimited potential for review as a
result. That potential would not be acted on again until a plurality held
in Chaoulli v. Quebec that a prohibition on access to private health
insurance violated section 7 because it was arbitrary.
4. Lingering Doubts
In the MVR, then Justice Lamer announced that “[a]djudication under
the Charter must be approached free of any lingering doubts as to its
legitimacy”.72 It was a brave statement and a declaration that, to some,

69
70
71
72

Id., at para. 198.
Id., at para. 206.
Id., at para. 225 (emphasis added).
MVR, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 15 (emphasis added).
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might have looked careless. Against that statement, it is ironic that
Lamer J. appeared to harbour lingering doubts of his own. His
concurrence in the Solicitation Reference signalled those doubts by
urging rigid adherence to the contours of MV logic.73 There, Lamer J.
wrote separately and at length in an attempt to thwart efforts to enlarge
section 7 beyond a mandate that was strictly focused on the justice
system.
After the MVR, the Court was invited to expand section 7 in a
variety of directions. It responded willingly when called upon to adopt
principles of fundamental justice that bore a relation to the Charter’s
other legal rights. Those elements of the jurisprudence, which are
referred to in this paper as the “basic tenets” branch of PFJ
methodology, are addressed in the next part. Meanwhile, the MVR’s
conclusion that imprisonment results in a prima facie breach of liberty
shifted the analysis to section 7’s second clause, where much of the
criminal law was automatically subject to principles of fundamental
justice. The Solicitation Reference arose under the Criminal Code but
showed how section 7’s entitlements could be defined to enhance the
guarantee’s substantive content.74 That was anathema to Lamer J., who
regarded an expansive view of liberty or security of the person as a
threat to the institutional conception on which the legitimacy of review
depended. Unlike the second part of section 7, the entitlements clause
contains no language that targets the institutions of justice. To the
contrary, liberty and security of the person are unencumbered by any
textual indicia of definitional limitation. To hold the Court in a pattern
of strict compliance with MV logic, it was necessary to read section 7’s
entitlements restrictively.
The issue in the Solicitation Reference was whether the Criminal
Code’s solicitation provisions were unconstitutional under section 2(b),
section 2(d) or section 7 of the Charter. On the entitlement issue, the
question under section 7 was whether the provision infringed a
prostitute’s liberty to pursue a profession of choice or her security of
interest in procuring the basic necessities of life. To Lamer J., the sheer
prospect of section 7 being open to an interpretation that included
economic content demanded a quick and decisive response. Thus he
73

[1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123.
In declining to give any other content to liberty or to consider the meaning of security of
the person, Lamer J. had specifically and deliberately reserved the point in the MVR; supra, note
72, at para. 22.
74
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implored the Court to limit liberty of the person to state interferences
with an individual’s physical freedom.75 In effect, Lamer J. proposed to
read the institutional content of the PFJ clause, which already qualified
liberty and security of the person, back into section 7’s concept of
entitlement. That would limit both parts of the guarantee to matters
arising in the administration of justice.76
At first impression, this approach to the entitlements clause seems
strained and unnecessary. Yet the context is one in which Lamer J. had
promised, in the MVR, that the Court would not enter the realm of
public policy through section 7. In the circumstances, it is not surprising
that he so candidly expressed his fear that unless the courts adhered to
MV logic, they would intrude on that domain.77 Likewise, he had
insisted that the Court’s interpretation would not provoke concerns
about the legitimacy of review, because the Charter was structurally and
textually different from its U.S. counterpart. Ironically, the concerns that
he readily dismissed in the MVR required full exposure in the
Solicitation Reference, and his apprehension is palpable in the care he
took to outline the dangers of U.S. due process jurisprudence.78 To keep
the MVR’s promises the Court would have to be especially vigilant
about excluding economic entitlements from the Charter.

75

Following lengthy discussion, he summarized his position in these words: “s. 7 is
implicated when the state, by resorting to the justice system, restricts an individual’s physical
liberty in any circumstances”; Solicitation Reference, supra, note 73, at para. 68 (emphasis in
original); he added that the guarantee is also implicated when the state “restricts individuals’
security of the person by interfering with, or removing from them, control over their physical or
mental integrity”; id.
76
Specifically, he indicated that “the principles of fundamental justice can provide an
invaluable key to determining the nature of the life, the liberty and the security of the person
referred to in s. 7”, id., at para. 63; then he added that “the restrictions on liberty and security of the
person that s. 7 is concerned with are those that occur as a result of an individual’s interaction with
the justice system, and its administration”; id.
77
Specifically, he stated that “the confinement of individuals against their will, or the
restriction of control over their own minds and bodies, are precisely the kinds of activities that fall
within the domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system”. In contrast, he added, “once
we move beyond the ‘judicial domain’, we are into the realm of general public policy, where the
principles of fundamental justice … are significantly irrelevant. … The courts must not, because of
the nature of the institution, be involved in the realm of pure public policy”; id., at para. 66
(emphasis added).
78
Id., at paras. 51-60 (culminating in a rejection of the American line of cases, on grounds
that they have a specific historical context, that this context incorporated laissez-faire values that do
not apply to the Charter, and that there are significant differences between the American and
Canadian texts).
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It was apparent from his reasons in the Solicitation Reference that
Lamer J. thought MV logic was at risk of being overtaken by a
conception of section 7 that would threaten the Court’s legitimacy.79 In
the circumstances, it was essential for him to stall any momentum in
favour of an expansive interpretation of the entitlements clause. The
MVR’s theory of review depended on both clauses receiving an
interpretation that was consistent with that view of the guarantee. Thus
he stressed the necessity of an “exclusionary approach” to section 7’s
entitlements; only in that way could the court build a doctrinal Maginot
line to prevent dangerous conceptions of entitlement from seeping or
stealing into the Charter. Other colleagues neither agreed nor disagreed,
and seemed content — at that point in time — for Lamer J. to conduct a
solo mission to constrain the scope of section 7.80
5. Elements of the Offence: Defences and the Actus Reus
The Court had abandoned the constitutionalization of mens rea but was
not finished with the substantive criminal law. When it took its next
step, the drastic consequences which followed discouraged further
developments in this area. In R. v. Daviault a majority held that the
accused is constitutionally entitled to rely on a defence of intoxication.81
Excusing an individual who has committed a crime while drunk is
difficult in the best of circumstances; the aggravating circumstances of
this case made the decision a public relations disaster for the Court.
79
Cases in which “economic” claims were advanced include R. v. Edwards Books and Art
Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 150 (per Dickson C.J. rejecting a claim
that Sunday closing laws violate s. 7, on the ground that “‘liberty’ in s. 7 of the Charter is not
synonymous with unconstrained freedom” and stating, “I cannot accept that it extends to an
unconstrained right to transact business whenever one wishes”); and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at paras. 94-95 (rejecting a claim that an
advertising law violated a corporation’s s. 7 rights, because “a corporation cannot avail itself of the
protection offered by s. 7 of the Charter” and “economic rights as generally encompassed by the
term ‘property’ are not within the perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee”); see also Wilson v. British
Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1988] B.C.J. No. 1566, 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.)
(holding that s. 7 is not confined to freedom from bodily restraint and, without extending to
property or pure economic rights, could include the right to choose one’s occupation).
80
For instance, Dickson C.J. noted that the possibility of imprisonment satisfied the
entitlement part of the s. 7 liberty analysis, and otherwise found it unnecessary to consider whether
s. 7’s guarantee of liberty was violated in another, “economic” way; Solicitation Reference, supra,
note 73, at para. 14. Similarly, Wilson J. found that imprisonment deprives a person of liberty and
that it was neither appropriate nor necessary to characterize the legislation as raising a question of
“economic” liberty; id., at para. 139.
81
[1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
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Daviault was a chronic alcoholic who sexually assaulted an elderly
disabled woman while in a state of drunkenness severe enough to cause
his own death.
Against a widely held perception that Daviault showed appalling
insensitivity to violence against women and a Court that was “out of
touch”, Peter Russell predicted that “[t]here’s going to be more of a
backlash” against the judges.82 Carl Baar remarked that “[t]he key issue
… is the legitimacy of the court”, and added that “[l]egitimacy requires
a ‘reservoir of support’ so that when something controversial happens,
the institution can withstand the pressures and criticisms”.83 Though that
reservoir of support may have been present in some quarters, the
negative response to Daviault prompted a legislative reaction:
Parliament enacted an amendment to the Criminal Code which
effectively negated the Court’s decision.84
Many could not look past Daviault’s facts to the principle at stake.
The contest was between the judges who thought that intoxication at
certain levels negated the requisite mens rea of the offence, and others
who were willing to substitute self-induced intoxication for the mental
element required for sexual assault.85 In concluding that a defence
should be available, Cory J.’s majority opinion held that substituting
intoxication for the mens rea of sexual assault eliminated the minimum
mental element and was “so drastic and so contrary to the principles of
fundamental justice” as to be unjustifiable under section 1.86
In fairness to the judges who signed the majority opinion, Daviault
applied MV logic to a question that had divided the Court for years.
Former Chief Justice Dickson had written an influential dissent in R. v.
Leary which maintained that the defence should be available to those
who commit offences while under the influence of alcohol.87 His
position gained new momentum in R. v. Bernard with the claim that the
82
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 33.1(1), as am. by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (selfinduced intoxication), S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1.
83
Quoted in Sean Fine, “Has the Highest Court Lost Touch With Reality? When
Protecting the Rights of the Accused May Not Serve the Public Good” The Globe & Mail (8
October 1994), at D2. Note, however, that the Court’s two woman judges, L’Heureux-Dubé and
McLachlin JJ., joined the majority opinion.
84
Id.
85
The judges in the majority who agreed that a defence should be available on these facts
included Lamer C.J., together with La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ.;
those who supported the concept of substituted mens rea included Sopinka, Gonthier and Major JJ.
86
Daviault, supra, note 81, at para. 47.
87
[1977] S.C.J. No. 39, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29.
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Charter’s arrival altered the status of the defence.88 There, the Court was
closely divided in a case where Wilson J. wrote separately to offer a
compromise between otherwise unyielding positions.89 Justice Cory
followed her proposal in Daviault and introduced a defence of
drunkenness akin to automatism or insanity.90 Having made the analogy
to automatism, he imposed the onus on the accused to establish the
defence on the balance of probabilities.91 Finally, he emphasized that the
defence would only be available in a small number of exceptional cases
of extreme intoxication.92 Despite the care he took to place limits on the
defence, the Court was condemned for a decision which was widely
regarded as unforgivable.
It appears that the Court emerged from Daviault’s highwater mark
somewhat chastened by the experience. Since then, it has refused to
entertain the Charter claim in newsworthy cases such as R. v. Latimer,93
R. v. Malmo-Levine,94 and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth
and the Law v. Canada.95 The exception to the Court’s retreat from the
constitutionalization of the substantive criminal law is R. v. Ruzic.96
There, the Court invalidated elements of section 17 of the Code, which
defines the defence of duress, but did so quietly and in a way that made
the statutory definition more compatible with the common law test.97
Latimer did not raise an issue of moral innocence and did not fit the
pattern of MV logic as a result. Robert Latimer was the Saskatchewan
farmer who ended the life of his severely disabled daughter and then
pleaded the defence of necessity in answer to his murder charge.
Though his circumstances did not satisfy the criteria for the defence, his
challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years

88

[1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833.
Rather than allow or deny it for all general intent offences, she proposed that the defence
be available at the level of “extreme intoxication involving an absence of awareness akin to a state
of insanity or automatism”; id., at para. 90.
90
Daviault, supra, note 81, at para. 59.
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Id., at paras. 63-65.
92
For instance, he stated that “[i]t is obvious that it will only be on rare occasions that
evidence of such an extreme state of intoxication can be advanced and perhaps only on still rarer
occasions is it likely to be successful”; id., at para. 60.
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[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3.
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[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571.
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[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 [hereinafter “CYF”].
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[2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687.
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See R. v. Hibbert, [1995] S.C.J. No. 63, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973.
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imprisonment was more plausible.98 Still, the Court unsympathetically
dismissed his case in an opinion that anonymously and unanimously
deflected the question of sentence to the royal prerogative of mercy.99
Subsequently, the Court refused in CYF to invalidate section 43 of
the Code, which provides a “reasonable force” defence to those who
would otherwise be answerable for assaulting children.100 Under section
7, the Court was not asked to constitutionalize a defence that would
reduce criminal responsibility; the question instead was whether it
should eliminate a defence and thereby equalize children as victims of
assault. In other words, the challenge sought to widen the scope of
criminal responsibility. Though the Court was divided, a majority
refused to constitutionalize a child’s right to be free from corporal
punishment.101 It would have been impossible to strike the provision
down without interfering in family life and the parental prerogative to
impose reasonable punishment on their children. Rather than invite
controversy for doing so, McLachlin C.J.’s reasons adopted the unusual
but increasingly familiar strategy of re-interpreting the provision
aggressively to cure elements of residual unconstitutionality.102
Finally, the issue in R. v. Malmo-Levine was whether the Court
would follow MV logic and find a constitutional minimum for the actus
reus.103 The issue there was Canada’s marijuana laws and, more
specifically, whether it is permissible for Parliament to criminalize
conduct that, it was claimed, does not cause harm. In those

98
Latimer, supra, note 93, at para. 42 (concluding that there was no air of reality to
Latimer’s claim on any of necessity’s three requirements); and at para. 87 (concluding that the
mandatory minimum was not disproportionate in the circumstances of the case).
99
Id., at paras. 89-90. It is as though the Court was divided on this question and agreed to
a compromise which upheld the sentence as a matter of law but issued suggestive messages about
the merits of executive intervention through the prerogative of mercy, id.
100
CYF, supra, note 95. Section 43 reads: Correction of child by force: 43. Every
schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by way of
correction toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not
exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.
101
CYF, id. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote for six members of the Court who rejected the
claim under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter; Binnie J.’s partial dissent found the s. 15 claim valid
against teachers, but not against parents; Deschamps J. also dissented and would have struck s. 43
down under s. 15 of the Charter; finally, Arbour J. dissented but would have invalidated the
provision as a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.
102
To avoid invalidating the provision on vagueness grounds, she read criteria into the
provision to define a risk zone for the criminal sanction; id., at para. 44 (explaining and identifying
the boundaries of corrective force that is “reasonable in the circumstances”).
103
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571.
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circumstances, the connection between MV logic, the actus reus and the
harm principle was this: once the MVR created a constitutional
minimum for mens rea it followed that there must be a minimum for the
actus reus as well; that minimum would prohibit Parliament from
punishing conduct that does not cause harm.
Malmo-Levine confronted the Court with its own logic and asked
that the actus reus be treated the same way, for purposes of section 7
and the principle of constitutional minimums, as the mens rea. Despite
being caught by it, the Court refused to act on or extend the logic of the
MVR. Perhaps it seemed perilous to invalidate marijuana laws at a time
when the decriminalization of simple possession was under active
debate, publicly and in Parliament. Beyond that, the suggestion that the
legislature’s power to criminalize conduct might be subject to a
constitutional threshold of harm was more radical. Denying Parliament
the authority to declare certain conduct criminal cuts more deeply into
the realm of policy than a constitutional requirement of fault.
Justice Arbour’s dissent began with the proposition, which was
taken directly from the MVR, that “a ‘person who has not really done
anything wrong’ is a person whose conduct caused little or no reasoned
risk of harm or whose harmful conduct was not his or her fault”.104 This
led to the proposition that “[i]t is a fundamental substantive principle of
criminal law that there should be no criminal responsibility without an
act or omission accompanied by some sort of fault”.105 At that point she
equated the guilty mind and the guilty act in the principle that stigma
and punishment are proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the
offender “only if there is a sufficiently blameworthy element in the actus
reus itself”.106 Thus she concluded that principles of fundamental justice
require that “whenever the state resorts to imprisonment, a minimum of
harm to others must be an essential part of the offence”. Absent that
minimum, she said that the offence must be declared unconstitutional.107
As a matter of doctrine and precedent, as well as in principle,
Arbour J.’s dissent was compelling. Her view did not prevail, in part,
because the Court had too many times been betrayed by MV logic. At
first, the principle of moral innocence led to a constitutional minimum
for mens rea that seemed to fall within the domain of the judiciary, as
104
105
106
107

Id., at para. 190.
Id., at para. 227 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 230 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 244.
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guardian of the justice system. But as the Court discovered in DeSousa,
Creighton and other cases, that principle posed problems and a
correction was necessary. As revised, Parliament’s definition of fault
would only be vulnerable in instances of serious disproportionality
between the accused’s blameworthiness and the stigma and punishment
he would suffer. Then, when MV logic was extended to the defence of
intoxication the Court paid dearly for it. By the time of Malmo-Levine,
that conception of section 7 had limited credibility as a theory of
substantive review. Since then, the Court has endorsed a version of the
harm principle, but not as a Charter principle.108 Once the constitutionalization of the substantive criminal law ground virtually to a halt,
the Court became more receptive to a conception of section 7 that fell
outside the terms of the MVR.
6. Beyond Criminal Justice
For years, the Court refrained from endorsing or rejecting a view of
section 7 that restricted its scope to the institutions of justice and to the
criminal justice system, in particular. Though Wilson J. laid the
foundation for a broader view of the guarantee, and of liberty of the
person, section 7’s presence outside the criminal justice system was
modest.109 The Court began to break away from that view of section 7 in
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society.110
CAS concerned non-criminal proceedings to remove a minor
temporarily from parents who refused, for religious reasons, to allow
blood transfusions which were medically necessary. On the face of it,
the central issue was whether wardship proceedings met the
fundamental justice clause’s conception of a fair procedure. The Court
had little difficulty agreeing that the proceedings did not violate the
Charter rights of the minor’s parents. More problematic was the
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See, e.g., R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (reading a requirement
of harm into the Criminal Code’s definition of indecency, in the context of consensual sexual
activities at group sex clubs).
109
Despite the importance of Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, s. 7 had little impact on immigration law; see, e.g.,
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] S.C.J. No. 27, [1992] 1
S.C.R. 711. And whether regarded as falling within criminal justice or not, the extradition cases
failed as well; see Reference re Ng Extradition, [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 and
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
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[1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [hereinafter “CAS”].
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question of entitlement under section 7, and whether the guarantee
protected parental liberty in the circumstances. Justice La Forest’s
affirmative answer placed his conception of section 7 directly in conflict
with that of the Chief Justice. For that reason, the latter’s concurring
opinion might be described as Lamer C.J.’s “last stand”. In many ways,
his response reprised the views he had expressed in the Solicitation
Reference. Meanwhile, La Forest J. also provoked Iacobucci and Major
JJ. to write that section 7 does not protect the rights of parents when a
child’s survival is at stake.111
Justice La Forest acknowledged the existence of competing
definitions of liberty and noted that the term had not been
authoritatively defined by the Court. In the circumstances, he declared
himself free to reject a definition of “mere freedom from physical
restraint” and to proclaim that “the individual must be left room for
personal autonomy to live his or her own life and to make decisions that
are of fundamental personal importance”.112 Justice La Forest’s
conception drew on Wilson J.’s opinions in Jones and Morgentaler, as
well as on American precedent from the problematic Lochner era which
survived the doctrinal purge after the court crisis of 1937.113
Meanwhile, Lamer C.J. strenuously maintained, as he had in the
Solicitation Reference, that liberty of the person must be limited to
encounters with the administration of justice which place an individual’s
physical freedom at risk.114 He insisted, in advancing that argument, that
no other interpretation of section 7 made sense. Chief Justice Lamer
backed that view up with an analysis of the guarantee and its
relationship to the legal rights, as well as to other guarantees, such as
section 2(a). More explicitly than in the Solicitation Reference, he
maintained that the connection between section 7’s two clauses meant

111
Id., at paras. 212-14 (holding that “the right to liberty embedded in s. 7 does not include
a parent’s right to deny a child medical treatment that has been adjudged necessary by a medical
professional”, and that “[t]here is simply no room within s. 7 for parents to override the child’s
right to life and security of the person”).
112
Id., at para. 80.
113
Id., at 364-65 S.C.R. See S. Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative
Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1-55.
114
In CAS he introduced a theory of the person, as a corporeal entity, as the connection or
linkage between s. 7’s entitlements. As he explained, “the connection is found in the person himself
or herself, as a corporeal entity, as opposed to the person’s spirit, aspirations, conscience, beliefs,
personality or, more generally, the expression or realization of what makes up the person’s noncorporeal entity. The right to liberty, in this context, must therefore be set up against imprisonment,
detention or any form of control or constraint on freedom of movement”; id., at para. 33.
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that the guarantee’s entitlements had to be limited to the institutional
processes of the justice system. The Chief Justice’s position was that
“[t]he liberty in question must therefore be one that may be limited
through the operation of some mechanism that involves and actively
engages the principles of fundamental justice”.115 To rationalize that
view he explained that, “[a]part from a situation in which the state
engages the justice system”, it was difficult to see how those principles
could have application.116
The most revealing parts of his opinion expose his fears about the
consequences of releasing the guarantee from the constraints of MV
logic. He alleged that the concept of liberty proposed by Wilson J. and
endorsed by La Forest J. “would not only be contrary to the structure of
the Charter and of the provision itself, but would also be contrary to the
scheme, the context and the manifest purpose of section 7”.117 For him,
the most serious problem was the absence of limits on the guarantee’s
scope and the lack of any principled way to set limits.118 He fretted that
La Forest J.’s definition would confer constitutional protection on “all
eccentricities expressed by members of our society” and “would
inevitably lead to a situation where we would have government by
judges”.119 Ironically, these are the arguments he dismissed when he
gave section 7 a substantive interpretation in the MVR.
In the contest to control the meaning of the entitlements clause, La
Forest J.’s opinion in CAS must be regarded as a turning point. He did not
win majority support for his definition of liberty, but four members of the
Court supported his view of the entitlement.120 Moreover, by rejecting a
conception of entitlement based on freedom from physical liberty, La
Forest J. also rejected the MVR’s theory of review. As a result, and
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Id., at para. 20.
Id.
117
Id., at para. 36.
118
As he explained: “since most laws have the effect of limiting a freedom, the same
approach could mean … that a large proportion of the legislative provisions in force could be
challenged on the ground that they infringe the liberty guaranteed by s. 7. It would then be for the
courts … to decide whether or not the freedom invoked was a fundamental freedom…, whether the
limit complied with the principles of fundamental justice…, or whether the limit was reasonable
and could be justified…. We must keep in mind, first, that what may be important and fundamental
to one person may very well not be to another, including the judge who hears the case, and second,
that by adopting this approach the judiciary would inevitably be legislating, when this is not its
function. Id., at para. 35.
119
Id., at para. 36.
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To his vote those of L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. were added.
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despite a valiant campaign, Lamer C.J. was isolated in his views from
other members of the Court. Whether he was prepared to admit it or not,
liberty of the person had crossed the doctrinal Maginot line — the
boundary he regarded as vital to the legitimacy of review under section 7.
The Court which had fractured badly in CAS unanimously supported
the section 7 claim in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services) v. G. (J.).121 This decision extended section 7
beyond the criminal justice system, and did so with the Chief Justice’s
blessing. Like CAS, G. (J.) raised a section 7 claim in the context of
civil proceedings undertaken by the state to protect children from their
parents. A second point of similarity was that G. (J.) also focused on
fundamental justice and what a fair procedure required in the
circumstances.
That is where the resemblance ended. G. (J.) held that the
government’s failure to provide legal representation to a parent who
might lose custody of her children in a court hearing violated
fundamental justice by depriving that person of the opportunity to
participate effectively in the hearing.122 In CAS the Chief Justice had
rejected the proposition that section 7 protects any element of parental
liberty unrelated to physical restraint by the state. He avoided that
obstacle in G. (J.) by shifting his attention to security of the person.
Chief Justice Lamer was not troubled that neither liberty nor
security of the person had been extended beyond the criminal law
context. Previously, he had acknowledged that section 7 could apply to
civil proceedings, but only in settings where the state invoked the
machinery of the justice system to deny an individual’s physical liberty;
civil committal to a mental institution was the example he used to
illustrate the point.123 Without explaining the analogy between
deprivations of physical liberty and a parent’s relationship with children,
he simply declared that a child custody hearing engages section 7. That
view was based on the conclusion that removing a child constitutes “a
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[1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.
Id., at paras. 84-85 (concluding that the parent needed to be represented by counsel for
there to be a fair determination of the children’s best interests, and that without the benefit of
counsel she would not have been able to participate effectively at the hearing).
123
Solicitation Reference, supra, note 73, at para. 66 (citing the civil processes of
restraining a mentally disordered person or isolating a contagious person as two examples of s. 7
being engaged outside the criminal system); see also CAS, supra, note 110, at para. 22 (confirming
that s. 7 claims under this definition will arise primarily, but not exclusively, in the criminal justice
system).
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serious interference with the psychological integrity of the parent” and
“a gross intrusion into a private and intimate sphere”.124 Once that
question was settled, section 7’s second clause was in play because child
protection proceedings directly engaged the justice system. In the end
the Court held that section 7 requires the state to fund counsel in
removal proceedings where an unrepresented parent would be deprived
of her right to participate effectively in the hearing.
Technically, G. (J.) fell within the terms of MV logic. Despite
emphasizing physical restraint as the definition of liberty, the Chief
Justice adopted a different standard for security of the person. Though
the two are textually distinct, his opinion raised the question whether
and to what extent these entitlements should or do share common
ground.125 In any case, G. (J.) also fit the MVR’s institutional
requirement of engaging the justice system: despite the absence of a
criminal law context, the proceedings arose in the administration of
justice. Chief Justice Lamer may have done what he could to protect his
conception of section 7, but it was not enough. Once he retired it would
not take the Court long to expand section 7’s definition of liberty.126
7. Beyond the Administration of Justice
Events would vindicate Lamer C.J.’s fear that without a disciplined
connection between section 7’s two clauses, an entirely different
approach to the guarantee was possible. Justice Wilson had advanced a
generous definition of liberty, but done so in the MVR’s context of
criminal or regulatory law. Children’s Aid Society located La Forest J.’s
support for a broad conception of liberty in judicial proceedings
concerning a temporary wardship order. By endorsing the Wilson-La
Forest definition of liberty in a setting without any connection to the
administration of justice, Godbout v. Longueuil (City) took the next big
step.127 After an interval, Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W.
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G. (J.), supra, note 121, at para. 61.
Note, in comparison to the Chief Justice’s view of liberty, as a purely corporeal concept,
what he said about security of the person: “As an individual’s status as a parent is often
fundamental to personal identity, the stigma and distress resulting from a loss of parental status is a
particularly serious consequence of the state’s conduct”; id.
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See Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 307.
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also applied a section 7 analysis in a setting outside the formal
institutions of justice, without giving the matter a second thought.128
In Godbout v. Longueuil, the Court unanimously concluded that a
rule requiring a municipal worker to reside in the employer’s city was
unreasonable. While six members of the Court decided the case under
the Quebec Charter, three others held that the condition violated section
7 of the Charter. That view, which was advanced by La Forest J. and
supported by L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ., was without
precedent. First and foremost, the claim posed a free-standing
substantive challenge to the municipality’s resolution which lacked an
interaction with the justice system. Oddly, the La Forest J. plurality did
not regard that as a bar to the claim. Second, La Forest J. restated his
definition of liberty from CAS and applied it to invalidate a job
requirement. In doing so, he dismissed the pre-existing taboo the
jurisprudence had placed on granting section 7 economic content. It is
remarkable, in these circumstances, that Lamer C.J. remained silent.129
Finally, though not discussed here, it is noteworthy that, in the absence
of any identifiable principle of fundamental justice, La Forest J.
invalidated the residency requirement by engaging in a balancing of
interests that subsumed the section 1 analysis.130
Rather than present it in cautious or subtle terms, La Forest J. was
forthright about his conception of the guarantee. Quick to disagree with
the Chief Justice’s views, he stated that the guarantee must be read “in
light of the values reflected in the Charter as a whole, and not just those
embodied by the other provisions described as ‘legal rights’ ” .131 From
that perspective he went on to conclude that liberty protects “the right to
128

[2000] S.C.J. No. 48, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519.
He joined the reasons of Major J., which disposed of the appeal under the Quebec
Charter, and otherwise stated his agreement with the other plurality opinion by Cory J., that “it is
unnecessary and perhaps imprudent to consider whether the residence requirement infringes s. 7 of
the Charter”. Godbout, supra, note 127, at para. 1.
130
Id., at para. 76 (stating that “looking to ‘the principles of fundamental justice’ often
involves the more general endeavour of balancing the constitutional right of the individual against
the countervailing interests of the state”, adding that “performing this balancing test in considering
the fundamental justice aspect of s. 7 is both eminently sensible and perfectly consistent with the
aim and import of that provision” and concluding that “balancing individual rights against
collective interests itself reflects what may rightfully be termed a ‘principle of fundamental
justice’”); and at para. 91 (stating, following discussion of the residence requirement, that there is
“no need to examine the issues … under the rubric of s. 1 of the Charter, given that all the
considerations pertinent to such an inquiry have … already been canvassed in the discussion
dealing with fundamental justice”) (emphasis added).
131
Id., at para. 63 (emphasis added).
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an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may
make inherently private choices free from state interference”.132 Justice
La Forest added the qualification that the entitlement extends only to
matters that are “fundamentally or inherently personal”, — those
matters which, in his words, implicate “basic choices going to the core
of what it means to enjoy dignity and independence”.133 As his
discussion of choosing where to live reveals, these were hardly
objective criteria. He conceded that “intensely personal considerations
often inform” this decision,134 but denied that Godbout’s section 7 claim
implicated any notion of a constitutional “right to employment” or “any
other economic right”.135 For La Forest J., the choice of a home’s
location was a “quintessentially private decision going to the very heart
of personal or individual autonomy”.136
With that, the La Forest J. plurality effectively abandoned the twin
pillars of MV logic, at least as conceived by Lamer C.J. The first was
that a claim arising under section 7 must arise, somewhere or somehow,
in the administration of justice. The second was that the institutional
criterion should also inform the definition of section 7’s entitlements.
After the La Forest J. concurrence in Godbout rejected both elements of
that logic, the next step came in Blencoe v. B.C. Human Rights
Commission, when Godbout’s definition of liberty was adopted by the
Court.137
K.L.W. represents a further departure from MV logic.138 There, the
Court was divided on the question whether fundamental justice required
prior authorization, in the form of a warrant, for the non-emergency
apprehension of a child. Once having cited G. (J.), L’Heureux-Dubé J.
and Arbour J. agreed, without discussion, that the state’s action engaged
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This is the distinction he drew: Godbout’s real complaint, he said, “is not simply that
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she sees fit”. Id., at para. 61.
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the parent’s security interest.139 Each then proceeded to a discussion of
what principles of fundamental justice required in the circumstances;
each did so without noting or commenting on the absence of any link
between the section 7 claim and the administration of justice.
G. (J.) and K.L.W. set the stage for Gosselin v. Quebec, where
Arbour and Bastarache JJ. defended radically different conceptions of
the guarantee.140 The violation of rights arose from the province’s
welfare scheme, which created a system of differential payments for
those over and under the age of 30. It was, primarily and on its face, an
equality case. The novel claim under section 7 was that Quebec’s failure
to extend adequate assistance to those under age 30 violated their
security of the person and was fundamentally unjust for that reason. Not
only did the claim lack any connection to the administration of justice, it
advanced a concept of entitlement that was purely economic. Gosselin
asked the Court to intervene in the policy realm and decide who would
get which benefits and why; in doing so, the case sought additionally to
impose a positive obligation on the province to equalize payments
across age-differentiated classes of beneficiaries.141
As members of the Court in the majority watched on, Arbour and
Bastarache JJ. fought a battle in dissent over the direction of section 7.
Justice Arbour proposed a conception of the guarantee which was
fearlessly radical. To her credit, she made the argument from, rather
than against, precedent. She proposed that section 7’s first clause
protects free-standing substantive entitlements which ground positive
obligations, on the part of the state, to guarantee minimum social and
economic standards.142 Justice Arbour carefully reviewed the decisions
139
The majority opinion by L’Heureux-Dubé J. easily found a breach of security of the
person, and then turned to the question whether prior judicial authorization was constitutionally
required in non-emergency situations, id., paras. 85-87; similarly, Arbour J. stated that “[i]t is
common ground that the removal of a child from a parent’s custody by the state infringes the
parent’s right to security of the person”, and then addressed the question whether the warrantless
apprehension of the child violated principles of fundamental justice; id., at para. 5.
140
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429.
141
Chief Justice McLachlin’s majority opinion upholding the program under ss. 7 and 15
was joined by Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ.; a minority comprising L’Heureux-Dubé,
Bastarache, Arbour and LeBel JJ. found it unconstitutional under s. 15; Arbour and L’HeureuxDubé JJ. alone found in addition that the program violated s. 7 of the Charter. See J. Cameron,
“Positive Obligations under Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment on Gosselin v. Quebec”
(2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 65.
142
Addressing the relationship between s. 7’s two clauses, she said that her position
“entails reading the first clause as providing for a completely independent and self-standing right,
one which can be violated even absent a breach of fundamental justice”; Gosselin, supra, note 140,
at para. 341.
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to establish that nothing in the existing jurisprudence precluded that
conception of the guarantee; to the extent the MVR created certain
assumptions about section 7, the case law could not foreclose an
alternative that had never been considered by the Court.143 In addition,
she synthesized disparate pieces from the jurisprudence to cobble
authority for the controversial elements of her conception. For instance,
she maintained that a legal conception of section 7 and link to the
administration of justice had been attenuated by the Court in Blencoe
and K.L.W.;144 she cited G. (J.) for the proposition that section 7 can
address omissions by the state;145 she also found support for the
imposition of positive obligations in G. (J.), as well as in Dunmore and
Vriend, albeit under other provisions of the Charter.146
Once finished, Arbour J. had created an alternative conception of
section 7 which recognized substantive entitlements under the
guarantee’s first clause, and adopted a methodology which bypassed the
PFJ analysis in cases where the claim did not engage the administration
of justice. The lingering doubts that had pervaded the jurisprudence
since the MVR were scarcely noted in her reasons.147 Under her view, the
administration of justice aspect of the guarantee would be addressed by
the PFJ clause, and a parallel track would handle claims, such as
Gosselin’s, arising under the entitlements clause.
Given its reach and its implications both for the substantive content
and institutional boundaries of section 7, it is not surprising that her
conception encountered stout resistance. Though the rest of the Court,
speaking through McLachlin C.J., left its options open by not choosing
sides, Bastarache J. unequivocally rejected Arbour J.’s position in a
dissent of his own.148 The nature of the threat to Gosselin’s security was
a primary concern for him. There, he was adamant that “the threat to the
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In particular, she stated that the Court “has never ruled” that we must reject any positive
claim against the state, and “has consistently chosen instead to leave open the possibility of finding
certain positive rights to the basic means of subsistence within s. 7”; id., at para. 309.
144
Id., at para. 318 (explaining that these decisions relax any “supposed requirement that
the right claimed under s. 7 display the characteristics of a ‘legal right’ similar to those at stake in
the administration of criminal justice”).
145
Id., at paras. 324-25.
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Id.
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Id., at paras. 330-35 (undertaking a discussion of “justiciability” and concluding that any
concern over the justiciability of positive claims against the state had little bearing in the case).
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person’s right must itself emanate from the state”.149 He considered, “at
the very least”, that the claim must arise from determinative state action
that “in and of itself” deprives a person of one of section 7’s
entitlements.150 He was far from convinced that any insecurity the
claimant suffered was caused by the state.
Justice Bastarache was equally emphatic that a claim under section
7 must be grounded in the administration of justice. In his view, the
strong relationship between the guarantee and the role of the judiciary
led to the conclusion that “some relationship to the judicial system or its
administration must be engaged before section 7 may be applied”.151
Only then, he continued, “may the process of interpreting the principle
of fundamental justice or the analysis of government action be
undertaken”.152 He found that the welfare challenge did not meet section
7’s requirements because the claimant “was not implicated in any
judicial or administrative proceedings, or even in an investigation that
would at some point lead to such a proceeding”.153 His reason for
insisting on that constraint traced its roots to the MVR, the decision to
grant section 7 a substantive interpretation, and the terms under which
the Court took that step. As he put it in Gosselin, the “judicial nature of
the section 7 rights” could not be ignored without bringing “the
legitimacy of the entire process of Charter adjudication” into
question.154
With other judges choosing not to commit to a view of section 7, it
is difficult to know whether and to what extent Arbour J.’s dissent had
influence within the Court. At the least, it focused attention on some of
section 7’s unresolved questions. In addition, it demonstrated that
another conception of the guarantee was possible — that MV logic need
not foreclose whole categories of section 7 claims. Perhaps most of all,
it is significant that Arbour J. refused to be intimidated by the doubts
that had cast a long shadow over the guarantee since the MVR. Though
it did not apply Arbour J.’s methodology in Chaoulli, it is an interesting
question whether the McLachlin-Major JJ. plurality opinion would have
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taken such bold steps on its own, had she not laid the groundwork in
Gosselin.
8. Into the Realm of Public Policy
Chaoulli v. Quebec provoked strong responses, both for and against the
Court’s decision to invalidate a prohibition on private health
insurance.155 As advocates for medicare “slammed the decision as the
first step in the evisceration of universal public health care”, Quebec’s
Health Minister responded that “[t]his ruling does not ring the starting
bell for a frantic, unbridled race toward the creation of a parallel, twotier system”.156 It was even suggested that the decision, “while
momentous in its legal and bureaucratic implications, could prove to be
revolutionary as an economic turning point in Canadian history”.157 In
some quarters, Chaoulli was welcome news; in others the decision was
described as disappointing, shocking and deeply disturbing.158
For purposes of the paper, health care policy is of less concern than
Chaoulli’s consequences for section 7. In this case the Court divided
strategically, in a way that opened the guarantee’s frontiers up but left
its future uncertain at the same time. Three members of the panel held
that the prohibition violated the guarantee’s principles of fundamental
justice because it was arbitrary, and could not be saved under section
1.159 Three others held that the claim did not raise issues of constitutional
interpretation that could or should be resolved by judges.160 With the
seventh member of the panel providing the determinative vote on
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statutory grounds, the split exposed a fault line inside the Court.161 On
one side were judges who were prepared to invalidate legislation falling
outside the MVR’s institutional theory of review; on the other were
those who favoured a conception of section 7 that is based — in whole
or in substantial part — on that conception of the guarantee.
It is ironic, in the circumstances, that the joint opinion by
McLachlin C.J. and Major J. cited the MVR as authority for Chaoulli’s
unprecedented exercise in review. Recalling Lamer J.’s words in that
historic case, they repeated that “it is the high duty of this Court to
insure that the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their
constitutional mandate”.162 In light of that duty, the McLachlin-Major
plurality stated that “[t]he fact that the matter is complex, contentious or
laden with social values does not mean that the courts can abdicate the
responsibility” of review.163 As far as they were concerned, “[t]he mere
fact that this question may have policy ramifications does not permit us
to avoid answering it”.164
If the MVR’s distinction between justice and policy had all but
vanished long before Chaoulli, a section 7 challenge to the health care
system was difficult just the same. First of all, in the absence of a link to
the administration of justice, access to private health insurance was a
free-standing substantive entitlement, not entirely unlike the right to
welfare payments which had been rejected in Gosselin. Yet the plurality
in Chaoulli was not prepared, as Arbour J. had been there, to abandon
the principle that a breach of section 7 requires dual violations. Second,
then, unless an identifiable principle of “justice” could be found, it was
difficult to see how access to private health insurance could be brought
into the terms of section 7’s principles of fundamental justice.
To find a violation, the McLachlin-Major plurality opinion
effectively bypassed other PFJ methodologies in favour of a standard of
arbitrariness. This concept was developed by McLachlin J. in her
Rodriguez dissent, and was applied in R. v. Malmo-Levine.165 As noted
in the discussion above, rather than identify the substantive content of a
PFJ, “arbitrariness” allows the Court to invalidate laws which are seen
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as fundamentally unjust. It was unsound in Rodriguez for that reason,
and Chaoulli was no different. The concept’s application in the health
care case is reflected in the way the joint opinion posed the question, as
being “whether the measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real
relation to the goal and hence being manifestly unfair”.166 That
characterization also served the all-important goal of forging a link
between the Dickson and Beetz opinions in Morgentaler, and a
conclusion that restrictions on health care insurance are
unconstitutional.167
Meanwhile, Binnie and LeBel JJ. objected in the strongest terms to
a section 7 intervention. Their opinion resisted the Court’s institutional
competence to address a “complex fact-laden policy debate” about
access to care.168 It is a debate, they insisted, about social values, not
constitutional law. And as far as the two were concerned, a legislative
policy is not arbitrary because judges disagree with it.169 From that
perspective, they charged that the plurality opinion suffered from “an
interventionist view of the role courts should play in trying to supply a
‘fix’ to the failures, real or perceived, of major social programs”.170
Justices Binnie and LeBel observed that the subject of the litigation,
health insurance, was “far removed from the usual concerns of section
7”.171 It was problematic for them that the challenge did not arise out of
an adjudicative context or one involving the administration of justice. In
their view it would be rare for the guarantee to apply in circumstances
“entirely unrelated to adjudicative or administrative proceedings”.172
Under their conception, section 7 provides relief for the breach of an
identifiable principle of fundamental justice; it follows that the further
the state’s action lies from an adjudicative context, the more difficult it
will be for a litigant to establish a principle of fundamental justice.173
The Binnie-LeBel plurality also denounced the McLachlin-Major
arbitrariness analysis and its attempt to bootstrap the result in Chaoulli
166
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from the authority of Morgentaler. They complained that the “manifest
unfairness” Beetz J. and Dickson C.J. spoke of in Morgentaler had
never been applied outside a criminal law context, and “certainly not in
the context of the design of social programs”.174 Justices Binnie and
LeBel also rejected an analogy between the context and purpose of
Morgentaler’s manifest unfairness standard and the conclusion in
Chaoulli that a prohibition on health insurance was arbitrary.175 As they
put it, bluntly enough, “[w]e see no parallel”.176 In this way,
Morgentaler’s legacy was a key issue in Chaoulli. The McLachlinMajor opinion represented a plurality of three, and its value in shaping
section 7’s future may depend, in part, on the strength of that analogy.
Yet Chaoulli’s debate about manifest unfairness and arbitrariness
reinforces the point, made earlier in the paper’s discussion of
Morgentaler and Rodriguez, that neither standard offers a section 7
methodology that is conceptually or analytically defensible.
If adopted by a majority, the McLachlin-Major conception of
section 7 would bring the Court frontally and unapologetically into the
realm of public policy. And so, with Chaoulli, discussion about the
legitimacy of review is back to where it started in the MVR: the road the
Court stepped onto there has travelled a great distance, in a circle, and
has returned to the beginning. After the MVR, Jamie Cameron predicted
that “a substantive interpretation for section 7 necessarily meant that the
courts would run interference on legislative programs and would do so,
also necessarily, on extra-textual, subjective grounds”.177 Similarly,
following Chaoulli, Sujit Choudhry claimed that the decision not only
“repeats many of the judicial mistakes closely identified with the
Lochner court; it may in fact be worse”.178 Meanwhile, Allan
Hutchinson remarked that “[f]or all those who lauded the Charter as a
harbinger of all that is good and true in the democratic scheme of things,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaoulli must be considered to be the
end of the line”.179 And Christopher Manfredi argued that “Chaoulli …
174
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is the entirely predictable consequence of a process in which the Court
has progressively liberated itself from the ideas that there are fixed
limits to its decision making capacity and that the Charter has any
meaning independent of what judges give it through ‘broad and
purposive’ interpretation”.180
9. Conclusion
From the moment it chose to reject the drafters’ intention of restricting
section 7 to procedure, the Court was aware of the need for limits on the
guarantee’s scope. At the same time, the text’s appeal to “fundamental
justice” pulled the judges instinctively in the direction of a generous
interpretation. MV logic proposed a form of substantive review which,
according to Lamer J., would eliminate the risk of encroaching on
policy. Yet it was mistaken to think that by focusing on the institutions
of the justice system the Court could avoid entangling itself in policy
review. Moreover, any assumption that review could be reserved for
injustices arising in the institutions of the justice system, and not
exercised elsewhere, was misguided. Neither the text nor the intent of its
drafters supported that view of the guarantee.
Chaoulli all but abandoned MV logic. By decoupling fundamental
justice and the administration of justice requirement, the McLachlin-Major
plurality has made the search for limits more urgent than ever. The Court
recognizes that section 7 has a distinctive role to play in the criminal
justice system and more generally in the development of the Charter’s
legal rights. Yet some judges, and perhaps a majority on the Court, are
unwilling to accept an interpretation of the guarantee that is rooted,
exclusively and selectively, in the institutions of the justice system.
Until the Court settles on a role for section 7 in the Charter’s
scheme of rights, limits on the guarantee’s scope will remain unknown.
For that step to be taken the judges must be prepared to choose between
competing interpretations of the guarantee. The final part of the paper
provides a preliminary discussion of that issue. Before turning to that, it
is helpful to review the Court’s interpretation of section 7’s two clauses.
Accordingly, the next part shows the degree to which indecision about
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section 7 is reflected in the Court’s approach to the “entitlements” and
“principles of fundamental justice” clauses.

III. SECTION 7 METHODOLOGIES
1. Introduction
As noted at the beginning of the paper, the text of section 7 created
interpretive challenges. The presence of two clauses, the abstract
character of each and the suggestion of an internal limit complicated the
task of defining the guarantee’s content. The decision to grant section 7
a substantive interpretation and to rely on a distinction between justice
and policy in doing so added further layers of complexity. Once having
made that choice, the Court faced competing imperatives in a variety of
contexts. In this dynamic, the impulse to enforce section 7 rights was set
against ever-present doubts about the legitimacy of review. It was
wishful thinking for the judges to imagine that those doubts could be
quelled by assertions of the Court’s duty and mandate of review under
the Charter.
This section shows how the Court’s inability to choose a substantive
and institutional role for section 7 has infused its interpretations of both
clauses. The consequences are structural as well as doctrinal in nature. It
is not only the content of the analysis but also its function that has been
affected. This is true of both clauses but is particularly manifested in the
development of the Court’s PFJ “methodologies”.
Whether by design or not, the MVR’s focus on the second clause set
the pattern for the jurisprudence. In Chaoulli v. Quebec, Binnie and
LeBel JJ. literally underlined the point by declaring that, “[t]he real
control over the scope and operation of s. 7 is to be found in the
requirement that the applicant identify a violation of a principle of
fundamental justice”.181 By treating that requirement as determinative,
the Court avoided the unwelcome task of restricting liberty and security
of the person. At the same time, doing so served to deflect elements of
the entitlement analysis to the second clause. As a result, the nature of
the claim is considered twice under section 7: once in defining liberty
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and security of the person, and a second time, in deciding whether the
claim engages the guarantee’s principles of fundamental justice.
Meanwhile, the PFJ analysis also assumes the role section 1 was
intended to play in determining whether a limit is reasonable. Because
the guarantee’s second clause bears the brunt of the workload, divergent
functions are collapsed into and addressed under the rubric of
fundamental justice. Not surprisingly, the result is an array of
methodologies which overlap, intersect, and more generally obscure the
clarity and cohesion of the jurisprudence.
2. The Entitlements Clause
As concepts, liberty and security of the person are boundless. For that
reason, it was not obvious how the Court could place “principled” limits
on their scope. As it happened, relegating section 7’s first clause to a
minor role spared the Court from having to impose artificial restrictions
on these entitlements. The turning point came early, in the MVR, with
the conclusion that the principles of fundamental justice serve as
qualifiers on interests that otherwise might be impossible to contain.182
From that point on, dual violations were required to establish a breach
of section 7. By the time Arbour J. proposed, in Gosselin v. Quebec, that
they be given free-standing, substantive content, the Court was fixed in
a functional view of the PFJ clause as a brake on the guarantee’s
entitlements.
By enhancing the role of section 7’s “qualifier”, the MVR may
inadvertently have created a hierarchy between two clauses which, in
textual terms, are co-equals. The Court held that the analysis shifted to
the fundamental justice clause in every instance where the state
threatened an individual’s liberty with imprisonment. By reducing the
role of section 7’s first clause, the MVR effectively forced the
guarantee’s PFJ to develop a second level of entitlement analysis. The
question in that context was whether the criminal law’s threat of
imprisonment implicated a principle of fundamental justice; the answer
depended on whether the principle could be found in the “basic tenets”
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of the legal system. The “basic tenets” branch of PFJ methodology is
discussed in the next section; the point here is that the MVR’s focus on
the criminal justice system and its consequences for physical liberty had
significant consequences, not only for section 7’s concept of
entitlement, but for the relationship between the two clauses, as well.
It was predictable, following the MVR, that the Court would be
invited to broaden the concept of liberty in other directions.183 In setting
out, effectively, on a mission to prevent an Americanized approach to
section 7, Lamer J. developed two defensive strategies. The first
imposed an institutional definition on liberty of the person which would
restrict its scope to state interferences with physical freedom that
engaged the justice system. The second reverted to security of the
person when it was undesirable to recognize certain liberty interests.
Justice Lamer would discover that it was difficult to place
institutional constraints on a concept as fundamental and unconfined as
liberty. That is why his attempt to limit the interest to freedom from
physical restraint had little chance, over time, against Wilson J.’s
expansive definition of the right.184 Once embedded in Morgentaler, her
definition grounded an expansion of the concept which was
subsequently adopted by the Court.185 Following her retirement, La
Forest J. followed in her footsteps and did not hesitate, in doing so, to
denounce a model of entitlement based on physical liberty. In CAS, he
drew on Wilson J.’s opinions in Jones and Morgentaler, as well as on
American case law, to endorse the proposition that section 7 protects
fundamental personal choices.186 In Godbout v. Longueuil, he solidified
that view in a setting that unmoored the entitlement from its anchor in
the institutions of justice.187
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Not long after Lamer C.J. retired, Blencoe v. British Columbia
approved the Wilson-La Forest definition, but added the caveat that
“personal autonomy is not synonymous with unconstrained freedom”.188
Although it seems that a definition protecting decisions of fundamental
importance can only be broad, Bastarache J. stressed that the liberty
interest “would encompass only those decisions that are of fundamental
importance”: a “narrow sphere of inherently personal decision-making”
was the way he expressed it.189
Meanwhile, security of the person provided a convenient alternative
when negative connotations were associated with the liberty interest.
Morgentaler is a case in point: once Wilson J. supported a constitutional
right to abortion as an element of liberty, Dickson C.J. and Beetz J.
focused on the scheme’s interference with the physical and
psychological security of women seeking an abortion.190 Morgentaler
created a precedent for security of the person where regulations affect
bodily integrity, which was followed in Rodriguez v. British Columbia191
and Chaoulli v. Quebec.192 G. (J.) v. New Brunswick treated security of
the person as a doctrinal flag of convenience for the different purpose,
there, of sparing Lamer C.J. the awkwardness of defending his
definition of liberty in CAS.193 And once G. (J.) created authority for the
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proposition that child custody proceedings violate a parent’s security of
the person, the precedent was simply applied in K.L.W., despite the
absence of any connection with the administration of justice.
This quick review shows that liberty and security of the person do
not lend themselves to concrete definitions. That is why it was
unrealistic to expect the Court to place significant limits on those
entitlements.194 Still, the Court’s interpretations of these concepts raise
concerns. It is unclear, for example, whether and to what extent liberty
and security of the person protect different interests. Though Bastarache
J. maintained, in Blencoe, that they are distinctive entitlements, the line
between the two is not well articulated.195 As a result, it is difficult to
predict which interest is engaged and for what reason. The Court has not
explained what distinguishes an entitlement which protects personal
autonomy and fundamental personal choices from one which safeguards
the physical and psychological integrity of the individual.196 Though it
has singled state-imposed stress out in defining the interest, the Court
has not interpreted security in a way that convincingly separates it from
liberty of the person.
A related problem is that the Court formulated these interests in
broad terms and then indicated that each is subject to a reservation.197
That reservation grants the Court a broad discretion to exclude claims
which fall outside its perception of entitlement.198 Yet a discretion so
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subjective in nature is problematic.199 For these and other reasons, some
have urged the Court to support a broader conception of entitlement.200
Despite these concerns, the threshold under this part of the section 7
analysis is low, and the question of breach is decided, in practice, under
the second clause’s concept of fundamental justice. The key limit on
section 7’s entitlements is structural, and is found in the requirement
that an infringement of liberty or security of the person must also violate
a principle of fundamental justice.
3. PFJ Methodologies
(a) Introduction
The principles of fundamental justice are section 7’s workhorse because
the second clause has been called on to complete various steps in the
Charter analysis. As just explained, the issue of entitlement is dealt with
in a preliminary way under the first clause, and then carried over to the
deprivation clause, where the question is whether the interest can be
characterized as a principle of fundamental justice. Though the text of
the Charter commits this issue to section 1, section 7’s PFJ analysis also
considers the question of justification. Early in the guarantee’s
interpretation, the Court concluded that deprivations of fundamental
justice could only be saved in exceptional circumstances under section
1.201 As a result, the balancing of interests reverted to section 7, where it
is expressed in the language of fundamental justice. By assigning the
prima facie issue of entitlement a minor part and according section 1 a
de minimus role, the Court forced the PFJ clause to bear the burden of
the analysis virtually alone. Consequently, the clause has responsibilities
199
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particularly clear on how ‘fundamental personal choices’ are to be identified or, more basically,
why the meaning of ‘liberty’ in s. 7 should be restricted in this way”); at 522-23 (criticizing the
high threshold the Court has set for security of the person); and at 536 (concluding that the
jurisprudence has been two restrictive in defining the scope of s. 7’s entitlements).
201
MVR, supra, note 182, at para. 83.
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which overlap, collapse and combine the issues of entitlement and
justification.
This feature of section 7 doctrine is reflected in the methodologies
the Court has developed to interpret the PFJ clause; the key ones, for
purposes of this paper, include “basic tenets” analysis, section 7
balancing, unfairness standards and the Rodriguez test. In functional
terms, some of these concepts address a “secondary” question of
entitlement, and others serve as a substitute for the section 1 analysis.
For instance, by asking whether the interest in question engages a
principle of fundamental justice, the basic tenets inquiry performs a
secondary analysis of the entitlement issue. The Rodriguez test also
provides a second level analysis of the right at stake, but does so
through the application of a three-part test.202 Meanwhile, standards such
as manifest unfairness and arbitrariness skip that step and move directly
to a form of justification analysis.203 Finally, though section 7 balancing
addresses both issues, in most cases it too displaces section 1’s role.204
With the exception of the Rodriguez test, these methodologies have
co-existed, uneasily, from the early years of the section 7 jurisprudence.
Because the guarantee’s second clause serves a default function for a
variety of questions which the Court has been unwilling or unable to
address under other parts of the Charter, the PFJ clause has become a
morass of overlapping doctrines and methodologies. The discussion
which follows does not undertake to make these methodologies
comprehensible. Instead, it merely shows how they collide and ricochet
against each other as the Court reacts to the challenge of compressing
the entire Charter analysis into the principles of fundamental justice.

202
Rodriguez, supra, note 191, at para. 141 (stating that a mere common law rule does not
suffice to constitute a PFJ unless the principle in question is a “legal” principle, that there is some
consensus that the principle is vital or fundamental to our “societal” notion of justice, and that the
principle is capable of being identified with some precision and applied in a manner which yields
understandable results).
203
For manifest unfairness see Morgentaler, supra, note 190; for cases discussing
arbitrariness see Rodriguez, id.; Malmo-Levine, supra, note 165; and Chaoulli, supra, note 155.
204
Key examples of s. 7 balancing include R. v. Lyons [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2
S.C.R. 309; R. v. Beare [1987] S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; Thomson Newspapers v.
Canada, [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425; Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 143; and Godbout v. Longueuil (plurality opinion), supra, note 185.

152

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

(b) Basic Tenets Methodology
To the extent the Court’s section 7 jurisprudence has any organizing
principle, it is the proposition that the PFJ are found in the basic tenets
of the legal system as distinguished, under MV logic, from the realm of
general public policy.205 The MVR stated that those principles “cannot be
given any exhaustive content or simple enumerative definition”, but
“will take on concrete meaning as the courts address alleged violations
of s. 7”.206 That meaning would depend, the Court said, on an analysis of
the “nature, sources, rationale and essential role” of the principle
“within the judicial process and in our legal system, as it evolves”.207
Tenets embedded in the values and principles of the justice system
represent entitlements not guaranteed by the Charter’s legal rights which
are nonetheless deserving of constitutional protection. The basic tenets
which have been recognized thus far as principles of fundamental justice
are a mix of substantive and procedural. First and foremost among the
substantive interests recognized as a PFJ under section 7 is the MVR’s
principle of moral innocence. Though its impact on the substantive
criminal law fell short of expectations, the principle set the standard for
this branch of PFJ analysis. Other principles of fundamental justice
which have been identified through this process include the right of full
answer and defence,208 party autonomy209 and the right to silence.210
The doctrinal contours of this branch of section 7’s principles of
fundamental justice are less vital to this paper than its function and
relationship with other methodologies. In that regard, it is important to
note that each of the PFJ protected by section 7 through this process is
in the nature of a right. Each can be articulated at a level of abstraction
that makes it viable as a principle of fundamental justice. Moreover,
asking whether the primary liberty or security interest engages a

205
MVR, supra, note 182, at para. 30 (stating that “the principles of fundamental justice are
to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system”).
206
Id., at para. 65.
207
Id., at para. 64 (emphasis in original).
208
See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; R. v. Seaboyer,
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R.
411; and R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
209
R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
210
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151. Vagueness is an example of a
PFJ which is more in the nature of a prohibition on the state than a right that is held and claimed by
an individual; the leading case is R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606.
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principle of fundamental justice confirms that this methodology adds a
second layer to the question of entitlement. It is a further requirement
that the basic tenets must have pedigree in the common law judicial
tradition. To summarize, the claim must present a principle that the
Court recognizes as fundamental in the institutions of the justice system.
The MVR’s principle of moral innocence illustrates the
methodology. Moral innocence is the abstract principle which led to a
requirement of fault, under section 7, as an element of the offence. The
idea of fault, in turn, supported a concept of minimum mens rea, which
was based on the principle of symmetry. The doctrinal apparatus of
moral innocence included stigma and punishment as the key variables in
determining whether the penal consequences were proportional to the
accused’s moral blame. Even though the Court backed away from
symmetry and the concept of a minimum mens rea, the example shows
how this principle was constitutionalized under section 7.
On the procedural side, one of the abstract entitlements recognized
by the Court is the defendant’s right of full answer and defence. In R. v.
Stinchcombe, the Court held that this principle was a fundamental
element of the adversarial system and of the criminal justice system as a
result.211 Crown disclosure is a PFJ that is subject to limits nonetheless.
Initially qualified by relevance and privilege, full answer and defence
would subsequently be balanced against the rights of crime victims on
the question of third party production and access to sensitive counselling
and therapeutic records.212 In this way, rights which are recognized as
principles of fundamental justice are not absolute, but are subject to
limits which are determined in the process of defining the scope of the
entitlement.
Full answer and defence are two entitlements which entered section
7 through the MVR’s basic tenets methodology. Both had a foundation
in the underlying values of common law tradition, and both stated an
abstract principle which then assumed a doctrinal form that defined the
concept for purposes of section 7 and the PFJ analysis. To summarize,
211
R. v. Stinchcombe, supra, note 208. There, Sopinka J. explained that “[t]he right to make
full answer and defence is one of the pillars of criminal justice on which we heavily depend to
ensure that the innocent are not convicted”; id., at para. 17.
212
Id., at para. 17 (stating that the prosecutor retains a discretion not to disclose irrelevant
material, to withhold the identity of individuals in order to protect them from harassment or injury,
or to enforce the privilege relating to informers, and that the timing of disclosure is also subject to
discretion); see also R. v. Mills, supra, note 208 (upholding Criminal Code provisions that regulate
and limit defence access to third party counselling and therapy records).
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this methodology, in the main, was designed to recognize and protect
values that are rooted in the common law judicial tradition. As such, it is
tied to and limited by the underlying assumptions of MV logic. Its focus
on the values and operations of the judicial process forced the Court to
generate additional methodologies to accommodate other kinds of
claims. That is why section 7 balancing and fairness doctrines emerged
in response to issues which did not fit the “basic tenets” model.
(c) Section 7 Balancing
By now, balancing has become a routine element in the PFJ analysis. As
a way of setting internal limits, this methodology is confusing: not only
does it pre-empt the section 1 analysis, section 7 balancing assumes
different forms and serves different purposes. It is part of the internal
limits analysis in some cases but not others, and members of the Court
do not agree whether and when section 7 balancing is appropriate.
Suffice to say that this methodology raises complex issues which cannot
be fully discussed within the framework of this paper.213 In the
circumstances, the limited purpose of this section is to explain how it
fits with the other PFJ methodologies.
As noted in the Introduction, La Forest J. was balancing’s key
proponent. He found authority for an internal balancing of interests in
the MVR’s reference to the basic tenets and process of the judicial
process, and to the other components of our legal system.214 In his view,
those components include the underlying policies and rationales of any
legislation which interferes with liberty or security interests. He
reasoned that, to determine whether a principle of fundamental justice
has been violated, those policies must be balanced against the
entitlement. Unlike the basic tenets approach, balancing does not
articulate a principle of fundamental justice; instead, the analysis weighs
a legislative policy and its rationales against the individual right at stake.

213
The leading article is T. Singleton, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice, Societal
Interests and Section 1 of the Charter” (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 446.
214
MVR, supra, note 182, at para. 62 (emphasis added).
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Balancing received encouragement in a few early cases before being
advanced, more openly, in Thomson Newspapers.215 Justice La Forest
stated that the analysis seeks “a just accommodation between the
interests of the individual and those of the state, both of which factors
play a part in assessing whether a particular law violates the principles
of fundamental justice”.216 From there the Court extended and applied
section 7 balancing in Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) v. Chiarelli.217 Justice Sopinka approved La Forest J.’s
Thomson methodology in an immigration context, and stated, in
particular, that “in assessing whether a procedure accords with
fundamental justice, it may be necessary to balance competing interests
of the state and the individual”.218 Justice Sopinka also drew an analogy
to the Court’s extradition decision in Kindler v. Canada, and found that
to determine whether deportation per se violates section 7 the Court
“must look to the principles and policies underlying immigration
law”.219 Once he articulated the most fundamental principle, that “noncitizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the
country”, it followed that Parliament had made a “legitimate nonarbitrary choice” that it was “not in the public interest to allow a noncitizen to stay in the country”.220
Justice McLachlin took La Forest J.’s balancing the next step in
Cunningham v. Canada, before having second thoughts in Rodriguez
about the role societal interests play in setting internal limits on the
scope of section 7.221 In Cunningham she stated that section 7’s PFJ are
concerned “not only with the interest of the person who claims his
liberty has been limited, but with the protection of society”, and added
that “[f]undamental justice requires that a fair balance be struck

215
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, supra, note 204. The earlier cases include R. v. Lyons,
supra, note 204 (holding that Parliament’s “dangerous offender” procedure does not offend PFJ
because it accords with the fundamental purpose of the criminal law and of sentencing, which is the
protection of the public); and R. v. Beare, supra, note 204 (concluding that custodial fingerprinting
does not violate PFJ when weighed against the principles and policies that have animated
legislative and judicial practice in the field).
216
Id., at para. 176.
217
[1992] S.C.J. No. 27, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711.
218
Id., at para. 47.
219
Id., at para. 24. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 779.
220
Chiarelli, id., at para. 27.
221
Supra, note 204.
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between these interests”.222 Then her dissent in Rodriguez proposed an
exception to balancing where the state has acted arbitrarily. In that
setting she maintained that societal interests have “no place” in the
PFJ analysis because the state will “always” bear the burden of
justifying an arbitrary legislative scheme.223 Although her denunciation
of section 7 balancing relied on Lamer J.’s opinion in R. v. Swain,
Sopinka J.’s view was more consistent with the direction in which the
jurisprudence was moving.224 He maintained that the issue in
Rodriguez was whether “the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide is
arbitrary or unfair in that it is unrelated to the state’s interest in
protecting the vulnerable, and that it lacks a foundation in the legal
tradition and societal beliefs which are said to be represented by the
prohibition”.225 Justice Sopinka explicitly rejected McLachlin J.’s
attempt to declare the law arbitrary “without considering the state
interest and the societal concerns which it reflects”.226
On the face of it, the basic tenets inquiry and balancing look like
rather different approaches. The purpose of the first is to identify a
secondary entitlement which can be characterized as a principle of
fundamental stature in the justice system. Meanwhile, the style of
balancing that emerged simply tests the constitutionality of legislative
policies against the individual’s right to liberty or security of the person.
In the absence of an analysis of secondary entitlement, the balance
invariably favours societal interests over the interest at stake.227 Still, it is
worth noting that both methodologies practice balancing of a kind.
Though La Forest J.’s style of balancing is contextual or situational in
nature, the basic tenets approach balances values, once a PFJ is
identified, to define the scope of the principle.228

222

Id., at para. 17 (in the context of changes to the Parole Act and its conditions for release
on mandatory supervision) (emphasis added).
223
Rodriguez, supra, note 191, at paras. 207-208.
224
Id. (quoting Swain for the view that “[i]t is not appropriate for the state to thwart the
exercise of the accused’s right by attempting to bring societal interests into the principles of
fundamental justice and to thereby limit an accused’s s. 7 rights; R. v. Swain, supra, note 209, at
para. 46.
225
Rodriguez, id., at para. 148.
226
Id., at para. 147.
227
The plurality opinion in Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 844 is a notable exception.
228
See Young, supra, note 199, at 135 (stating that “the balancing approach to section 7
was designed to obviate the need to find elusive and specific principles of fundamental justice”, but
that “[i]n effect, all the Court is saying is that pursuing a legislative objective not consistent with
substantive principles of fundamental justice will violate substantive principles of fundamental
justice”).
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Three other decisions demonstrate how internal balancing became
such a confusing concept. In Godbout v. Longueuil, the La Forest
plurality moved directly from its definition of liberty under the first
clause to a balancing of interests.229 Without a link to the administration
of justice, it is difficult to see how choosing one’s home could be
expressed as a PFJ. Justice La Forest ducked the issue by stating that
balancing is a principle of fundamental justice in its own right. As he
explained, “the notion of balancing individual rights against collective
interest itself reflects what may rightfully termed a ‘principle of
fundamental justice’”.230 He added that “it is clear that deciding whether
the infringement of a s. 7 right is fundamental just may, in certain cases,
require that the right at issue be weighed against the interests pursued by
the state in causing that infringement”.231 When all was said and done,
the circumstances in which a violation of fundamental justice would be
determined by a situational balancing of interests remained unclear.
Once having tested the claimant’s right of liberty against the city’s
public interests in imposing a residence requirement on employees, he
held in that case that the fundamental justice clause had considered all
the issues that would have arisen under section 1.232 Analysis under that
provision was redundant as a result.
R. v. Mills presented a conflict between the accused’s right of full
answer and defence and a crime victim’s rights of equality and
privacy.233 Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci co-wrote an opinion which
rationalized section 7 balancing by attempting to distinguish it from
balancing under section 1. The key point, they said, is that section 7 is
concerned with “the delineation of the boundaries of the right in
question”, and section 1 is concerned with “whether the violation of
these boundaries may be justified”.234 That is why, they went on to
explain, “the nature of the issues and interests to be balanced is not the
same under the two sections”.235 The distinction suggested that section 7
balancing is aimed at the scope of entitlement rather than the
justification analysis, which should take place under section 1. This

229
230
231
232
233
234
235

Supra, note 227.
Id., at para. 76 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 78 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 91.
Supra, note 208.
Id., at para. 66.
Id., at para. 67.
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account failed to explain the anomaly that, despite the different
functions of balancing in these two provisions, section 1 plays little or
no role in section 7 cases.
The joint opinion by Gonthier and Binnie JJ. returned to this point
in Malmo-Levine. There, they rejected the proposition that “courts
engage in a free-standing inquiry under s. 7 into whether a particular
legislative measure ‘strikes the right balance’ between individual and
societal interests in general, or that achieving the right balance is itself
an overarching principle of fundamental justice”.236 Rather, they
acknowledged that the problem with a “general undertaking to balance
individual and societal interest, independent of any identified principle
of fundamental justice”, is that it would “entirely collapse the s. 1
inquiry into s. 7”.237 Justices Gonthier and Binnie claimed that section
7’s function is discrete because an internal balancing of individual and
societal interests “is only relevant when elucidating a particular
principle of fundamental justice”.238 There, the task of delineating
section 7’s PFJ “must inevitably take into account the social nature of
our collective existence”; to that limited extent, they insisted, societal
values play a role in defining the boundaries of the guarantee’s rights
and principles.239 Unfortunately, Malmo-Levine’s attempt to clarify it
left the purpose and application of internal balancing as obtuse as ever.
This review has been brief but may suffice, nonetheless, to show
that section 7 balancing has little redeeming value. It is not based on any
conception of the guarantee, does not apply an identifiable methodology
and is lacking in guiding principles. The Court claims that internal
balancing should be done in some cases but not others, without
explaining in concrete terms how that works; it also states that balancing
under the guarantee is different from the section 1 exercise, as if section
1 actually plays a role in these cases. Yet the section 1 balancing that is
requisite in all Charter cases is no more than a formality in those cases
which find a breach of fundamental justice. It is a further problem that
internal balancing under section 7 does not grant the entitlement an
adequate role in the weighing of interests. But nor does it consider
societal interests in a disciplined manner; unlike its section 1
counterpart, the justificatory analysis under section 7 lacks structure and
236
237
238
239

R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 96.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 98 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 99.
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rigour. To reform this methodology would require the Court to
reconceptualize the fundamental justice clause and to redefine the
relationship between sections 7 and 1. Suggesting how that might be
done is beyond the scope of this paper.
(d) Unfairness Standards and the Rodriguez Test
In R. v. Morgentaler the Court invalidated Parliament’s abortion law
because it was manifestly unfair. As a standard of constitutionality, this
concept lacks content and a methodology. Even so, it reappeared in
McLachlin J.’s Rodriguez dissent in the form of a Charter prohibition
against arbitrary laws. Thereafter, arbitrariness featured prominently in
the McLachlin-Major opinion in Chaoulli that Quebec’s prohibition on
private health insurance was unconstitutional. Like manifest unfairness,
arbitrariness — as a principle of fundamental justice — also lacks
content and a methodology. In function and effect, both propose a
“fairness standard” which allows the Court to invalidate laws simply
because they are considered unfair.
Justice McLachlin’s reliance on arbitrariness in Rodriguez prompted
Sopinka J. to respond with a three-part test.240 The purpose of the test in
that setting was to determine whether a right to die could be
characterized as a principle of fundamental justice. In functional terms
there can be little doubt that this test addresses the question of secondary
entitlement. Thereafter, the Court employed it, albeit in various
formulations, in Malmo-Levine and CYF, before Binnie and LeBel JJ.
invoked it against the claim of access to private health insurance in
Chaoulli.241
Experience has shown that when the test applies, the claim will
fail.242 That is because, in a roundabout way, its criteria are designed to
240
To repeat, a principle will not be considered a PFJ under this standard unless it states a
legal principle, there is some consensus that the principle is vital or fundamental to our societal
notion of justice, and the principle is capable of being identified with some precision and applied in
a manner which yields understandable results; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
[1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 141.
241
See Malmo-Levine, supra, note 236, at para. 113 (restating the Rodriguez test using
different language); CYF, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 8 and following
(restating the same test in altered terms once again); and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at paras. 208-209 (again modifying the language of the
test). I am grateful to Adrienne Moore, LL.B. 2006, for her insightful analysis of this test.
242
See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra, note 240, Malmo-Levine, id., CYF, id., and Chaoulli, id.,
(dissenting opinion).
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reinforce the assumptions of MV logic. The requirement of a legal
principle confirms the MVR’s concept of an institutional theory of
review and requirement of a link to the legal system. The consensus
element ensures that the interest in question has sufficient pedigree to be
described as a principle. Finally, making precision and manageability a
part of the test addresses the MVR’s concern with limits. In effect,
Rodriguez proposed a structure to determine principles of fundamental
justice which would protect the Court from entanglement in general
public policy. In that regard, it is telling that it applied in cases which
raised issues of burning social importance: the right to die, a parent’s
prerogative of corporal punishment, marijuana laws and the prospect of
a two-tier health system. Members of the Court who were determined to
prevent the institution from intruding into areas of democratic policy
relied on the Rodriguez test in these cases to deny the entitlement
recognition as one of section 7’s PFJ. Others who saw an injustice
which demanded a remedy chose a different methodology which
bypassed Rodriguez in favour of an arbitrariness analysis. The
advantage of arbitrariness is that it facilitates a conclusion of invalidity.
As mentioned earlier, the concept of arbitrariness eliminates the
secondary entitlement step which is found in other PFJ methodologies.
Once a provision is characterized as arbitrary, its unconstitutionality
becomes a foregone conclusion. Even so, there is an appearance of
analysis. Thus McLachlin J. found the Criminal Code’s prohibition on
assisted suicide invalid because it bore no relation to the circumstances
of Sue Rodriguez and was arbitrary, as a result, when applied to her.243
Subsequently, LeBel J. combined proportionality and balancing to
conclude, in Malmo-Levine, that Parliament’s marijuana possession
laws were “disproportionate to the societal problems at issue” and
“arbitrary and in breach of s. 7” as a result.244 In functional terms, this
methodology appropriates parts of the section 1 analysis, such as the
rational relation test and the concept of proportionality, and applies
them in a rigid, almost absolutist way. The result is a condemnation that

243
Rodriguez, supra, note 240, at para. 207 (stating that “[t]he principles of fundamental
justice require that each person, considered individually, be treated fairly by the law”, and that it
“does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice that Sue Rodriguez be disallowed what
is available to others merely because it is possible that other people, at some time, may suffer, not
what she seeks, but an act of killing”).
244
Malmo-Levine, supra, note 236, at para. 280 (dissenting opinion).
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the law is arbitrary and therefore violates fundamental justice.245 Once
found arbitrary under section 7, such a law cannot meet the rational
connection test of Oakes.246
While the McLachlin-Major plurality in Chaoulli jumped from
security of the person to the discussion of arbitrariness, Binnie and
LeBel JJ. applied the Rodriguez test and concluded that the aim of
health care to a reasonable standard in a reasonable time is not a legal
principle, that there is no societal consensus about what it means or how
to achieve it, and that it cannot be identified with precision.247 With the
Chief Justice and Major J. all but bypassing that standard, the point to
note is that arbitrariness and the Rodriguez test work at cross-purposes.
Each addresses a different element of the analysis: the three-part inquiry
tests the entitlement and its claim as a principle of fundamental justice;
an arbitrariness approach does not bother with that issue because its
purpose is to rationalize a conclusion that the interference with liberty or
security of the person is unconstitutional. To add to the confusion,
Binnie and LeBel JJ. also conducted an arbitrariness analysis in
Chaoulli, despite finding that the claim did not satisfy the requirements
of the Rodriguez test.248 They went on to demonstrate that the
McLachlin-Major opinion had altered the concept of arbitrariness so
that the standard was difficult, and even impossible, to satisfy.249
It is putting it generously to say that the result is incoherence when
the Rodriguez test is juxtaposed with arbitrariness. Moreover, while the
McLachlin-Major opinion ignored the three-part Rodriguez test in
Chaoulli, on the ground that arbitrariness is accepted as a PFJ, Binnie
and LeBel JJ. applied the Rodriguez test. Having done so, they moved to
the concept of arbitrariness and introduced yet another doctrinal
standard: a new three-part test of arbitrariness.250 Frankly, it is difficult
to make sense of this madness. Far from settling down, the Court’s PFJ

245
Chaoulli, supra, note 241, at para. 131 (stating that “[t]he question in every case is
whether the measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real relation to the goal and hence being
manifestly unfair”).
246
Id., at para. 155.
247
Id., at para. 209.
248
Id.
249
Id., at para. 234.
250
Id., at para. 235. (proposing three steps: (i) what is the “state interest” to be protected?
(ii) What is the relationship between the “state interest” thus identified and the prohibition? And
(iii) has it been established that the prohibition bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state
interest?).
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methodologies have become less stable and increasingly bizarre with
time.
(e) Conclusion
Cumulatively, the PFJ methodologies include a basic tenets approach,
numerous forms of internal balancing, fairness standards which include
manifest unfairness and competing conceptions of what arbitrariness is,
and the Rodriguez test, as modified on a case-to-case basis. The result is
doctrinal chaos. These methodologies address different elements of the
analysis and, for that reason, are often at cross-purposes with each other.
Yet competing methodologies face-off in the same case, with little or no
awareness on the Court’s part that, in function, different tests actually
address different parts of the analysis. This section of the paper does not
undertake to suggest a solution. Its purpose, instead, has been to show
the doctrinal consequences of the ongoing conceptual confusion which
surrounds the interpretation of section 7. The problems which afflict the
jurisprudence at present can only be magnified, compounded and
aggravated if section 7 expands in the direction suggested by the
McLachlin-Major plurality in Chaoulli.

IV. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN251
The paper is already long and its examination of the jurisprudence, from
the MVR to Chaoulli, has been complex. It is late, for present purposes
then, to introduce a lengthy discussion proposing a direction for the
future. Some observations can nonetheless be made in closing.
Section 7 may be the Charter’s problem child, in part, because it is
more demanding than the other guarantees. On the face of it, the text of
this provision is effectively free of content: it can accommodate as much
or as little as the judges choose for it. A ready-made conception was
provided by the drafters, who intended it to be limited in scope to
matters of procedure. Once having sidelined that view of the guarantee,
the Court had the opportunity — and the burden — to decide what
interpretation section 7 should be given. The paper shows how
demanding a task that has been. Without a conception of the guarantee,

251
I shall be telling this with a sigh Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two roads diverged
in a wood, and I —I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference.

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The Future of Section 7

163

the Court has been unable to make sense of its two clauses, or to define
their relationship to each other and to other parts of the Charter, such as
section 1 and the other legal rights.
Unwilling to be bound by MV logic, the Court is paradoxically
unwilling to let it go. Despite being aware of the dangers of entering
into the “policy realm”, the judges have been unable to stand by,
passively, in the face of perceived injustices which call out for a
remedy. Fearful that social and economic entitlements could lead to a
jurisprudential black hole, the Court has nonetheless enforced those
interests in highly selective circumstances. Cognizant that limits on the
substantive content of section 7 are imperative, the Court has failed to
articulate a definition of the guarantee that places boundaries on its
central concepts.
Section 7 is a guarantee which lacks an identity and, for that reason,
it is a guarantee that is remarkably fluid. At this moment, few
roadblocks stand in the way of an interpretation that would define its
entitlements inclusively, and extend the scope of review into the policy
domain. The guarantee can serve the demands of fundamental justice,
on questions of socio-economic policy as well as in the administration
of justice, if that is the role the Court chooses. At the same time, it
should be remembered that section 7’s fluidity can run in more than one
direction. It may not be too late to see it, in far more modest terms, as a
guarantee that has little or no substantive content, and is designed to
enforce norms of procedural fairness, in the administration of justice.
What the future holds for section 7 is up to the Supreme Court of
Canada and it is a matter of choice. Not choosing may be the one option
that is not open to the Court; as the paper has shown, in the absence of a
conception of the guarantee the section 7 jurisprudence and methodologies
make little sense and are non-functional. It is unacceptable, on any view,
for the status quo to continue.
Whichever form it takes, section 7 must be based on a conception of
entitlement and the guarantee’s role in the scheme of the Charter. In
choosing, there are three variables for the Court to consider. The first is
a theory of entitlement which explains what section 7’s purposes are and
how the interests it protects fit within the larger scheme, structural as
well as substantive, of the Charter. The second variable is institutional
in nature. The paper has shown that the abstract character of section 7’s
entitlements poses serious definitional challenges. Specifically, it is
difficult for the Court to concretize conceptions like liberty and security
of the person, not to mention fundamental justice, without flagging the
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legitimacy question. Definitions which are inclusive raise legitimacy
concerns when the entitlements at stake are effectively limitless in
scope. But definitions which are selective in interpreting such concepts
are unavoidably subjective, which is a hallmark of judicial activism and
problematic for that reason. The question for the Court is whether
section 7 can be given a substantive interpretation that avoids these
defects of legitimacy. To answer it, the Court must define section 7’s
concepts in a way that identifies and limits the scope of entitlement and,
in doing so, enforces the guarantee without committing institutional
transgressions. At present, it is not readily apparent how that challenge
can be safely negotiated. In addition, the third variable is methodology,
and this point is an important one: one of the paper’s central objectives
has been to demonstrate how the Court’s section 7’s methodology has
suffered in the absence of a conception of the right. The entitlement and
deprivation clauses must be interpreted in a way that supports and
applies a conception of the guarantee.
Interpretive choices at the opposite ends of the spectrum
demonstrate the interaction between variables. An inclusive conception
of the guarantee, along the lines Arbour J. had begun to develop, would
privilege the entitlement, almost exclusively, at the expense of
institutional boundaries and the need for limits. At the other end, a
conception which contemplates little or no role for substantive review
reveals a strong preference for institutional modesty, at the expense of
section 7’s rights. Other solutions, which seek a compromise between
these variables and have been discussed in the course of the paper, are
also problematic: they lack a conception of the guarantee and are based
on unsound methodologies. Section 7 balancing and fairness standards
are two such examples. They illustrate that choosing an interpretive
model for section 7 rests on a calculation of the two key variables: a
theory of entitlement and conception of institutional limits on review.
Whether and how a methodology can be constructed around different
conceptions of section 7 is another variable which must factor in the
calculation.
The sole conception of section 7 which appears to be blocked in the
jurisprudence, at present, is the one its drafters intended for it. Thus the
post-MVR jurisprudence is based on the assumption that section 7 can,
should and must be given a substantive interpretation. It is not the time
or place, in the late stages of this paper, to develop an argument for the
“road not taken”, except to say this. MV logic does not work, and
theories of review which would extend section 7’s reach into the policy
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domain, unrelated to the legal system, are institutionally risky. Chaoulli
has brought the Court full circle to where it started, in the MVR, on the
legitimacy debate. For that reason, the Court has the opportunity — as
well as the burden and responsibility — to look at section 7 afresh and
consider whether the road not taken would have made all the difference.
In doing so the Court should ask itself whether that road can still be
taken.
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